'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎13r] (25/248)

PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE 2 S
ON BAGHDAD.
insufficient number of light-draught steamers, we could adequately supply our troops there. As a military
operation, therefore, he holds that to occupy Baghdad with our present forces would be most unwise.
(Then follow various reasons in justification of this contention.)
The Viceroy did not accept this telegram, and in his reply omitted all allusion to
the Commander-in-Chiefs doubts as regards the sufficiency of existing river transport,
which doubts therefore were unknown to the Home Authorities.
13. On October 8 th, the Secretary of State addressed the following question to General
Nixon :—
Very urgent. To both occupy and hold Baghdad what addition to your present force are you confident
will be necessary ?
and on the 8 th the Secretary of State sent the following telegram to the Viceroy :—
Private. The Cabinet are so impressed with great political and military advantages of occupation of
Baghdad that every effort will be made by us to supply the force that is necessary. We do not wish to attempt
it with insufficient forces. I shall be glad to know whether you are satisfied that one division will suffice.
On the same day General Nixon telegraphed as follows : “ No additions are neccssr.ry
to my present force to beat Nur-ed-din and occupy Baghdad ; of this I am confident,” but
he added that he would require an additional division and one cavalry regiment to
enable him permanently to occupy Baghdad.
14. On October 9th, in a telegram, the Secretary of State stated to the Viceroy :—
Private. I hope in a few days to give you definite information as to possibility of reinforcements. Mean
while Nixon should maintain his present position and he should be prepared to advance if reinforcements asked
for can be sent to him. I should be glad if you would instruct him accordingly.
On the same day the Viceroy in a telegram to the Secretary of State states as follows :—
Private. I am glad of the Cabinet’s decision. After consultation with Sir B. Duff, I am of the opinion
that Sir John Nixon is in the best position to judge as to the number of troops that will be required, and when
a division is mentioned by him we understand him to mean a division fully organised with its proper proportion
of British troops and guns and its divisional cavalry. He asks for a cavalry regiment in addition to this.
We are prepared to accept his opinion, but we consider that it will also be necessary to ensure that the
British units now with him are to be kept up to strength by drafts from England, and these cannot be supplied
by this country. The Indian units will be kept at full strength by us. We may add that the reinforcing
troops should reach Baghdad not later than one month after the capture of that city, and this is the period
which we calculate must elapse before the Turks could concentrate in strength to attempt its recapture.
15. On the 14th, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the Viceroy :—
Private. Reinforcements for Force “ D.” A question has been raised as to the sufficiency of the reinforce
ments which General Nixon has asked for, or even of two divisions to hold Baghdad against forces which might
eventually be brought against him by the Turks. The General Staff are now considering this, and the Cabinet
hope to be given their report in three days.
We continue to attach the greatest importance to the capture of Baghdad if we can hold it securely. Please
let me know whether the chances of eventual successful advance are prejudiced by delay.
to which the Viceroy replied :—
Private. With reference to your private wire, regarding Baghdad, dated October 14th. Unless Baghdad
is strongly reinforced by the Turks in the meantime, and of this we see no immediate signs, the chances of
eventual successful advance will not be prejudiced by delay, although owing to the longer time the enemy will
have at their disposal for completing their defences the step will be more costly.
16. On the loth, the Secretary of State telegraphed to Viceroy :—
Private. Advance on Baghdad. If report of the General Staff is favourable to occupation of Baghdad,
the War Office contemplate transfer of the two Indian Infantry divisions from France to Egypt with the inten
tion of placing them at your disposal for Mesopotamia. But they cannot guarantee date of departure owing
to uncertainty of position in Near East and possible need of transport for other purposes. They do not con
sider it would be safe under the circumstances for Nixon to advance to Baghdad before these troops have
actually started from Egypt unless you can undertake to supply him temporarily with a division from India
in the event of these reinforcements being unavoidably delayed. I request early reply as to the possibility
of your undertaking the liability.
This is in continuation of my private telegram of October 14th.
17. On October 17th, the Viceroy telegraphed :—
After consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, we agree that in no case could I undertake to supply frorm
India, even temporarily, a further force of the strength of a division.
On the 21 st the Commander-in-Chief and Viceroy in a full and reasoned telegram
marked “ Private,” discussed alternative courses of action and gave their opinion in favour of
the plan of taking and occupying Baghdad. This, they stated, would present no difficulty
whatever provided they were guaranteed reinforcements of a full division of troop*
reaching Mesopotamia in two months.