'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎14v] (28/248)

26 PART V.—CORRESPONDENCE AND TELEGRAMS AS TO ADVANCE
ON BAGHDAD.
Sir Percy Lake, who at the time this telegram was received at Simla was Chief of the
General Staff, did not accept Sir Beauchamp Duff's interpretation of the meaning of this
telegram, and he told us so in his evidence. General Kemball, who, as Chief of Sir John
Nixon’s Staff in Mesopotamia, had sent the telegram, emphatically repudiated Sir
Beauchamp’s reading of it.
A reference to the telegraphic correspondence, makes it self-evident that General
Nixon’s reply referred to the delay caused to the pursuing river column by shoals and
shifting banks, as reported by General Nixon to the Secretary of State on October the 1 st.
It in no sense counteracted or modified his previous statement that his transport was inade-
I quate. Indeed, onlv four days later, on October 9th, he asked, as an urgent need, for
I more river craft to Ibe procured from India and indicated that his operations were very
\ seriously impeded by the insufficiency of his existing river craft.
25. The warning conveyed in a private telegram of October 21 st* from the Secretary
of State to the Viceroy of a possible concentration of 60,000 Turks at Baghdad in January,
1916, was acknowledged by the Viceroy in a private and reasoned telegram accepting the
risk. The information thus conveyed introduced a new factor into the situation, and
one which ought at once to have been forwarded to Sir John Nixon. Sir John Nixon in
his evidence before us could not recollect receiving this information, and Sir Beauchamp
Duff has informed us that this telegram was not transmitted to Mesopotamia. He
accounted for this oversight by the fact that it was a private telegram to the Viceroy
of which he had no official cognisance, nor was it filed in his Department. Sir John, how
ever, intimated that if he had been warned in time he could have stopped the advance
to Baghdad even on November 17th, i.e. a month later than this telegram. On that day,
i.e. four days before the battle of Ctesiphon, the War Office telegraphed from London
to General Nixon that General von der Goltz had left for Baghdad on November 10 th,
and that 30,000 Turks were marching from Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. to Irak. On the 20 th General Nixon
replied :—
For more than a fortnight my own agents have been giving me similar news of a large force under Von der
Cloltz, but at present I do not accept these reports as conclusive for various reasons.
Sir John Nixon’s over-confidence in his ability to crush the Turkish forces between
him and Baghdad might have induced him in October to ignore the warning from London
as to the large enemy reinforcements which might be brought down to Baghdad. Still,
the neglect to convey to him so vital a piece of information reflects seriously on the system
which allowed such inadvertence to be possible. If the substance of this important telegram
had been conveyed to the Viceroy in an official instead of a private telegram, it would,
as a matter of course, have been transmitted to Mesopotamia.
26. In alluding to the introduction by the Cabinet of political considerations into
the consultations of their military advisers, we do not wish to imply that this widening of
their survey is to be condemned or that it necessarily subjects those so actiug to criticism
or censure/ In a world-wide war the views, wants and aims of allies must be considered
and weighed, and operations may become necessary for the continuance and consolida
tion of existing alliances and of the co-operation which such alliance ensures. But when
such considerations do obtrude themselves into a military campaign the incidence of respon
sibility tends to shift itself. The military experts cannot be made solely responsible for
the consequences of a decision into the consideration of which outside political factors have
necessarily entered.t Sir Beauchamp Duff in part of his evidence laid stress upon the
introduction of outside political considerations into the conduct of the campaign, and
he stated that when such political arguments were adduced by those above him in authority,
he was ready to incur greater risks than would be justifiable if the matters under discussion
were to be regarded solely from a military standpoint.
27. In the decision arrived at by the Home Authorities, they were doubtless largely
influenced by the extreme confidence of those on the spot. There seems to have been a
general idea—not only amongst the Headquarter Staff of General Nixon, but also amongst
the Commander-in-Chief’s Staff in India—that there would not be any serious fighting
before Baghdad was reached. Even amongst the General Staff at Whitehall, the idea
prevailed that the difficulty was not to get to Baghdad but to remain there. The retreating
Turks were supposed to be thoroughly demoralised, and insufficient attention was paid to
the warnings of the War Office Intelligence Department that a very large number of
* Sec paragraph 18, ante.
-f See Secretary of State’s telegrams of October 5th, 8th, and 21st, in paras. 11, 13, and, 18 ante.