'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎17v] (34/248)

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PART VII.—OPERATIONS FOR RELIEF OF KUT.
(>. General Townshend arrived at Kut on December 3rd ,where, for what seem to be suffi
cient reasons, he determined to remain, and in this resolve he was supported by Sir John
Nixon and by India. The Turks closed in on him on the 7th, and at first the assaults
were numerous and severe, especially about Christmas, when there were three days’ fighting,
which terminated in the enemy being repulsed with such heavy losses that no serious
attempts to storm were made for the remainder of the siege.
There was, however, plenty of shelling and sniping; but the real enemy was starvation,
and it was this that compelled the surrender of the place on April 29th, 1916, after a
most gallant and tenacious defence of 147 days.
7 . This disaster would have been averted for a long time if the Arab population,
about 6 , 000 , had been expelled before the investment began. Sir P. Cox, the political
adviser, was averse to such a measure, as he was unwilling to hand them over to the tender
mercies of the Turks and hostile Arabs, but their retention undoubtedly added to the
difficulties of supply.
8 . The Tigris Army Corps, as the relief force was called, had been reinforced by two
divisions which had taken part and been severely punished in the murderous fighting in
France. In some quarters there was an impression that their moral had been impaired by
the trench conditions of warfare prevailing there, and that they were not so ready to face
the open as they might have been. However, we are of opinion that their conduct, under
the very arduous conditions which prevailed in Mesopotamia, does not lay them open to
this charge, and their heavy losses during the operations show how stoutly they fought.
9 . It is not proposed to go at all thoroughly into the actions fought m the
course of these operations. That would involve the study of strategic and tactical
considerations which had better be left to the experts to whom the history of the war will
be entrusted, when criticism will be easier than it is now. An exception is made in the
case of the attempt to take the Dujailah Redoubt at the battle of Es-Sinn (March 8 th,
1916), and to a certain extent in the case of the battle of Sanaiyat (April 6 th and 8 th, 1916),
as the results were exceptionally unfortunate and perhaps decisive so far as the relief of
Kut was concerned. We are indebted to our colleague, General the Hon. Sir N. Lyttelton,
G.C.B., for the ensuing analysis of these two engagements which in our opinion is justified
by the evidence placed before us.
10 . The advance from Ali Gharbi took place on January 4th, 1915. Fighting of
a severe description soon began. On January 6 th, General Younghusband was heavily
engaged on both banks of the River Tigris, and held his ground with difficulty. On
reinforcements coming up, the attack met with some measure of success on the right
bank, where the Turks were driven out of their entrenchments, and fell back from Sheikh
Saad to a new position on the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. , 10 miles up stream. On the 9th this position was
also forced, and the Turks again retreated 5 miles further to Hannah. These successes
were dearly bought, the losses amounting to nearly 6 , 000 . The next attack, on the Hannah
position, January 21 st, failed with considerable losses, 2,741, and for some time no very
serious fighting took place. General Aylmer blames General Younghusband for not following
his directions on January 4th, which were not to commit himself, but merely to hold
the enemy. General Younghusband admits receiving the order, and says he advanced
and “ felt the enemy hard on both banks,” which does not seem to have been quite in
keeping with the order. General Aylmer says “ he felt them too hard,” and this
seems to be true. General Aylmer also says that he fought the action on the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows.
against his better judgment, acting under superior order, and that he had proposed another
plan of attack, which was not accepted by Headquarters. This seems to have been the
case, and further it was clear that the hard fighting and heavy losses had told on the
men. Moreover, there was a shortage of artillery ammunition.
11 . The first attempts having thus failed, General Aylmer determined in March on
another plan. An important keypoint was the Dujailah Redoubt, about the right centre
of the Turkish lines. General Gorringe, Chief of the Staff, Tigris Corps, told us that it had
been ascertained that owing to an insufficient water-supply this fort was very lightly held,
the bulk of the troops told off for its defence having to camp on the bank of the river four
or five miles off. Consequently it was hoped that by a night march a superior force could
be moved across the Turkish front so as to arrive by daybreak near the redoubt and carry
it by assault before the reinforcements could arrive. On the face of it the idea seemed
practicable and sound ; all depended on the element of surprise, and this could only
be attained by strict punctuality. Let us see how the scheme worked out It must be