'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎23r] (45/248)

PART IX.—TRANSPORT.
43
A. Shortage of River Transport.
1 . River transport was from the beginning of the campaign a dominant factor, as
its sufficiency or insufficiency regulated the movements of the expedition. This funda
mental matter has been treated at considerable length in paragraphs 73 to 87 of the
Vincent-Bingley Report.* We concur with the finding therein, but as the terms of reference
to that Commission were more limited than ours, they were not able to go so far into the
matter as we have been able to do, nor to carry their investigations later than April,
1916.
2 . Evidence is overwhelming that a shortage of river transport existed from the time
of the occupation of Kurna in December, 1914, and became serious from and after May.
1915. Despite additions that were made, the shortage had become relatively even greater,
in April, 1916, than at any earlier period of the campaign, owing to the increased numbers
of the force Practically at no time after the advance above Kurna was river transport
adequate to requirements. It greatly delayed military operations, in which celerity was an
important factor for success, it affected the comfort and feeding of the troops, and it was
a direct cause of suffering to the sick and wounded. As evidence of the shortage, we
have been told that it took nearly two months to concentrate troops and supplies for
the advance from Amara to Kut-el-Amara, and that again the advance from Kut and
Aziziyeh towards Baghdad was fatally delayed from the same cause. It seems almost
certain that, but for the shortage of river transport, the Turkish Army would have been
destroyed between Amara and Ctesiphon ; but the want was most acutely felt during
the strenuous time when every day counted in the attempt to relieve the siege of
Kut. Here, in view of the straits in which General Townshend reported his force to be,
time was of the utmost importance.
3. General Lake, at that time General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, tele
graphed to the Chief of the General Staff, Delhi, on March 22 nd, 1916, as follows :—
I doubt firstly whether the paralysing effect which the inadequacy and late supply of river craft has had
on the operations up the Tigris is fully realised by the General Staff at home, and secondly, why our forecasts
as to what it will be possible to convey up river have varied, and of late have considerably developed. On
January 21st, 1916, when Aylmer fought his action at Hannah, there were 10,000 infantry and 12 guns in the
country available as reinforcements, but which, owing to this cause, could not be sent up to him in time.
On March 8th, the date of his last operations, I had, approximately, 12,000 infantry and 26 guns
which, for similar reasons, could not be forwarded.
The evidence shows conclusively that shortage of river transport was the chief cause
of the failure to relieve Kut.
4. River tonnage available for transport from Basra up river, and the requirements
at different periods, were as follows :—
Daily tonnage available. Daily requirements.
November, 1915 .. . . 150 tons . . .. .. 208 tons.
April, 1916 .. .. .. 250 to 300 tons .. .. 598 tons.
August, 1916 .. .. .. 450 tons .. .. .. 650 tons.
These figures are given in the Vincent-Bingley Report, and by Major-General Cowper
D A. and Q.M.G., though we make from the latter’s calculation of tonnage available the
deductions necessary according to evidence, on account of steamers broken down, or
undergoing repair. It will be observed that in each case the requirements have been
largely in excess of the tonnage available, without allowing for a further increase of
the force or for loss of steamers. It may be well to note that since the War Office took
over the management of the campaign in 1916, more foresight in preparation and energy
in action are evident. To a recent estimate of requirements (namely, 800 tons per day),
a 50 per cent, margin for possible increase of force or eventualities has been added,
and a large fleet, capable of carrying up river 1,200 tons daily, now has been, or is being,
provided, in addition to the transporting capacity of the railways.
5. The evidence before us tends to show that improved control and administration of
the river craft available would have mitigated the evils arising from the shortage, although
at no time could such improvement have entirely overcome them. In this connection it
should be noted that the work of controlling and managing a miscellaneous fleet of river
steamers, tugs and barges, with their crews, their upkeep and their traffic, was not in the
usual line of Army or Royal Indian Marine experience. It is, we think, unfortunate that
* See Appendix I.
F 2
(C 48—176)