'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎33r] (65/248)

* See Appendix I.
PART X.—MEDICAL BREAK-DOWN.
63
/ A. The Yincent-Bingley Report and its Principal Conclusions.
1. We have.already referred to the fact that our labours as regards the Medical arrange
ments for the campaign have been very greatly facilitated by the report of the Commission
appointed by the Government of India, of which Sir William Vincent was the Chairman,
and Major-General Bingley, and Mr. E. A. Ridsdale were the members. We desire to
acknowledge the thoroughness of their enquiry, and the proved accuracy of their account
of the facts. It is a somewhat novel occurrence that the report of one Commission should
by force of circumstances come under the immediate review of another, before whom
those found wanting by the first Commission get the opportunity of criticising and replying
to the condemnation passed upon them. We think Sir William Vincent and his colleagues /
are to be congratulated on the fact that practically none of their main conclusions are
impugned ; they are certainly not disproved. The vast majority of them, stated as they
are with studious moderation, are admitted.
2. Sir Alfred Keogh indeed drew attention to the fact that the non-inclusion of a doctor
on the Commission was doubtless responsible for a technical error as regards the numbers
fixed for medical officers and medical subordinates in certain hospitals, which had led
the Commissioners somewhat to over-estimate the paucity of doctors in the cases in ques
tion ; the attention of the Commissioners had not been drawn to the fact that the authorised
establishment of General Hospitals includes an allowance to enable casualties in action
amongst medical officers to be instantly replaced. This small technical error does not,
however, we are satisfied, vitiate the Commissioners’ conclusions as to the undoubted short
age of medical personnel. We should add that Sir Alfred Keogh, speaking generally,
said, “ I think it is a good report.”
3. Again, the Commissioners, speaking of the effect of the arrival of the 3rd and
7th Divisions from France, on the medical breakdown of January, 1916, say: “ The
medical establishment of the force was insufficient, before the arrival of these two Divisions,
and this deficiency was accentuated by the fact that they were despatched from France
in advance of their medical units.” The evidence before us shows that the 7th Division
fought in January, without the presence at the front of its own proper Field Ambulances.
But as regards the 3rd Division, a letter from Major-General Keary, who commanded the
Division, has been put before us which states :—
It is clear that two out of five Field Ambulances of the 3rd Division were concentrated complete with all
personnel and equipment at the front by January 19th, and were fully utilised in the fighting which took place
on January 19th, 20th and 21st. At this time only three battalions, and one double company of the 3rd Division
proper had arrived at the front.
The facts stated in this letter are supported by other evidence before us, and the obvious
effect of this evidence is to increase the proportion of the blame attributable to the authori
ties in Mesopotamia for the breakdown in January. In the case of the 7th Division we
do not attach blame to the British Military Authorities in France, who embarked the two
Divisions at Marseilles in the belief that they would be disembarked and reorganised
in Egypt. But this reorganisation did not take place, because later it was decided by
the War Office to hasten their arrival at Basra.
4. We think it is remarkable that the conclusions of an enquiry of this nature and scope
should, after almost meticulous examination, be only found liable to criticism in such
obviously detailed matters. That these two cases should stand almost alone is an eloquent
tribute to the value of the public service rendered by the Commissioners in their Report.
Of course, there are points on which those censured differ from the Commission. In any
case where the further evidence put before us seems to demand a qualification of the
Commissioners’ views, we have embodied that qualification in subsequent paragraphs
of this part of our Report.
o. Accepting therefore, the value and importance of the report of Sir William Vincent’s
Commission (usually known as the Vincent-Bingley Commission, owing to the fact that
Sir W. Vincent, and General Bingley were the two original members of it), we have printed
the Report itself in this volume,* together with a memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Duff,
'■* Commander-in-Chief in India, criticising the procedure of the Vincent-Bingley Commission.