'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎34r] (67/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
65
A. The Vincent-Bingley Report and its Principal Conclusions. .
Land Transpor t [conclusion)
The original organisation orders of Indian Expeditionary Force “ D ” did not include any wheeled transport
for the sick and wounded. According to “ War Establishments, India/’ each field ambulance should have
been accompanied by 8 ambulance tongas, in lieu of which the original orders for this force allotted an additional
number of riding mules.
We have no evidence that these riding mules were ever used by the wounded, though
their presence on one occasion in a very restive state is recorded by a witness. They
are obviously useless for serious cases.
13. The Commissioners continue :—
The omission to send wheeled transport was probably due to the fact that operations for some time were
likely to be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab. The history of the campaign
shows, however, that very shortly after the capture of Basra the operations extended to a considerable distance
from any river, and no satisfactory reason has been assigned for the failure to provide the ordinary form of
land ambulance transport for these operations. It is in evidence that on many occasions during the campaign
wheeled ambulances could have been employed. In fact, a few motors were used in the Ahwaz operations in
April and May, 1915, and again at Ctesiphon in November, and ambulance wagons of the English pattern were
employed with conspicuous success, to our own knowledge, in the operations up the Tigris in the beginning of
April, 1916. But throughout the campaign the usual form of ambulance transport has been the army transport
cart, that is, a small, springless cart made of wood and iron, drawn by mules or ponies, and ordinarily employed
for the carriage of supplies. When the evidence of the suffering caused by this means of conveyance, particu
larly in cases of fracture and severe injury, is considered, it is difficult to avoid criticising the action of those
responsible for this deficiency in severe language.
We entirely concur in this view\
We have been told that one or two motor cars were at the disposal of the General
Officer Commanding after the battle of Kut, and in the advance to Ctesiphon. We feel
strongly that a country which was practicable for cars for the General Officer
Commanding was equally practicable for motor convoys for the wounded. By April,
1916, a few motor ambulances were in use at the front, and Sir Beauchamp Duff’s evidence
is to the effect that ten were at the disposal of Force “ D.” We do not think they were
all in use at the front. On the other hand, telegrams before us show that the Turks had
twelve available at the front. We do not think it is creditable that in this matter the
provision by the Turkish Army, situated as it was, should have exceeded our own.
Medical Stoves and Efjwxpt/ienb
14. The arrangements for the supply of surgical and medical stores and appliances to meet the require
ments of the various units in Mesopotamia were, up to March, 1916, unsatisfactory. In the first place the
system of supply, laid down in the Medical Manual (War), India, was ill-adapted to meet the demands of a
large force operating 1,600 miles from India overseas. In the second place, owing to lack of river transport,
there was such delay and uncertainty in the delivery of these supplies, that medical officers have frequently
been hampered in their work. ^ J
For example, in the advance to Amara there was, if we are to accept the evidence
given us, a shortage of drugs, including castor oil, epsom salts, emetine, quinine and supply
of medical comforts, and the supply of lime juice and fresh vegetables was deficient.
We ourselves are convinced by the evidence before us that, though there was never
any general shortage of drugs, dressings, etc., at Basra, yet these and similar medical
necessities were on many occasions either in insufficient quantities or altogether lacking at
the front, when the need for them was great.
15. As regards electric fans, the Commissioners say (reporting in May, 1916)—
A certain number of fans were put into the general hospitals at Basra last year, but these were not sufficient
for all the wards, and none of the new hospitals there had up to the time of our leaving Basra been fitted with
these fans.
16. As regards ice, they say :—
We are informed that ice was available for all the hospitals in Basra during the hot weather of 1915, but
it certainly was not regularly available at Ahwaz, Nasariyeh or Amara, and up to the time of our departure
so far as we are aware, Government had not supplied any ice manufacturing plant to any station outside Basra.
17. The Commissioners add :—
This is a somewhat serious matter, as ice is not a luxury, but having regard to climatic conditions, an
absolute necessary for the treatment of the sick.
and we concur.
Preventive Sanitation.
18. On the subject of water supply the Commissioners say :—
Generally speaking, however, the only source of water supply at present is the nearest river, and we are
not satisfied that systematic and methodical attempts are made to render this water potable and innocuous
before it is used for drinking purposes.
(C 48—176,) r