'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎35r] (69/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
67
A. The Vincent-Bingley Report and its Principal Conclusions.
Battle of Ctesiphon.
24. They say that—
The medical establishment available on this occasion was inadequate to meet the demands made on
it, and that the arrangements for collecting the wounded on the battlefield, and accommodating them, pending
evacuation to the river bank, were far from satisfactory. It was very difficult for wounded men to ascertain
where they had to go for medical aid, and when field ambulances and collecting stations were found, the supply
of food, tents, blankets, hot water and any kind of comfort was insufficient. Further, owing to the shortage
of medical personnel, many of the patients both in the field ambulances near the battlefield, and at the encamp
ments by the river bank, did not receive proper treatment. There was some delay in evacuating the wmunded
to Laj, w r here the steamers to convey them to the base were moored, and it was not until the 25th that the
last of the wounded were removed to this spot. In the meantime, many suffered from exposure, want of food
and inadequate attention.
In the second place, save for two motor ambulances which were employed with great success, no proper
ambulance land transport was provided for the removal of the wounded to the river bank. There were a
number of steamers at Laj, some eight or nine miles from the battlefield, two only of which, however, had been
in any way prepared for the reception of the sick. Many of the wounded w T ere, it is true, able to walk or ride
to the river bank, but for the conveyance of stretcher cases the tw T o motors already mentioned, and ordinary
transport carts, alone were available.
Thirdly, the lack of properly equipped river hospital steamers proved, as may be well understood, in the
circumstances, disastrous.
The medical and subordinate personnel for these steamers, which w r as taken from field ambulances, wa»
inadequate for the number of the patients. The supply of medical stores and appliances, and even of food,
was in some cases insufficient. The arrangements for cooking the food w r ere defective, and the personnel to
distribute it was wanting. The arrangements for water-supply were unsatisfactory, the latrine accommoda
tion was insufficient, and there were not enough sweepers and bed-pans for the necessities of those patients
who could not struggle to the latrines. Finally, the wounded w’ere huddled together as close as they could
be packed on the decks, without beds or mattresses, and it was almost impossible for the medical officers to
attend to them properly. In some cases the vessels had, moreover, been used for the carriage of animals, and
it was impossible, in the time available, to clean and disinfect them.
Wounds which required dressing and re-dressing were not attended to, and the condition of many of the
patients who travelled by these steamers was, when they reached Basra, deplorable. There the wmunds of
many were found to be in a septic condition, and in urgent need of re-dressing. In some cases bed-sores had
developed, more than one patient arrived soaked in faeces and urine, and in a few cases, wounds w T ere found to
contain maggots.
Surgeon-General Hathaway admitted to us that the arrangements made “ were
absolutely inadequate,” and that the “ wounded suffered intolerable discomfort.” Sir
John Nixon when asked whether he dissented from the general proposition that the wounded
did suffer very great hardships on this occasion replied “ No, I do not dissent at all.”
25. We shall comment later on the very different description of things telegraphed
home to the Secretary of State at the time, but we would say here that, had the authorities
in India or at home had any inkling of the true state of affairs at the beginning of December,
special efforts might have been made at any rate to reinforce the medical personnel in
Mesopotamia in view of future operations.
26. Full credit should be given to all concerned for the fact that the wounded were
brought away in the retreat from Ctesiphon, and saved from Arab indignities and brutali
ties. At the same time, we believe that much of the sufferings of the wounded might have ,
been avoided, if adequate forethought had been shown in the planning and preparations
for the advance to Baghdad. For the actual arrangements on the battle-field Colonel
Hehir was responsible. We have had the advantage (not open to the Vincent-Bingley
Commission) of hearing Colonel Hehir's detailed evidence on the subject. Having regard
to the inadequate means at his disposal we do not consider that his dispositions are open
to serious criticism. We are of opinion, however, that he should have taken more vigorous
steps to represent the shortages in medical personnel and equipment before both the battle
of Kut and the battle of Ctesiphon.
Kut Relief Operations. January, 1916.
27. The medical arrangements during the January fighting, that is to say the battles
of Sheik Saad, Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. and Hannah, resulted in the most complete breakdown of all.
The fact that the 7th Division had not its proper complement of Field Ambulances,
has already been alluded to, but though this may have been a contributory cause, it cannot
be accepted as an adequate explanation of the breakdown.
estimony of our witnesses allows no shadow of doubt as to the accuracy of the
description of the facts in paragraphs 135 to 140 of the report of Sir W. Vincent’s Com
mission. The Field Ambulances were so overcrowded that patient after patient passed
tbrough them \rithout receiving medical attention or food. The river steamers were
short of equipment, sweepers, orderhes, bandages, medical comforts, blankets, bedpans,
(C 48—176) I 2