'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎37r] (73/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
71
C. Medical Administration of Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie.
39. But, whatever blame may attach to Colonel Hehir in not having made sufficient
requisitions for the proper equipment of the expedition, the primary responsibility in
respect of such equipment must, in our opinion, rest with the authorities in India. Up
to the first week in June, 1915, Surgeon-General Babtie was Director of Medical Services in
India. He is a man, both in experience and ability, above the average. He had
previously been employed at the War Office, and had been “ intimately connected ” with
the details of medical mobilisation He was considered of sufficient importance to be
detached to. Egypt in the Spring of 1915, in connection with medical problems which
had arisen there ; and in June of the same year need of his ability was experienced else
where in connection with the war, and he was recalled from India. Sir William Babtie
must therefore have been well aware of the standards and requirements of modern warfare,
and was to some extent in a position in India to ensure that such standards should be
conformed to. In his own words : “ The position of D.M.S. in India in relation to an expe
dition operating over the sea is practically the position of the War Office with regard
to an expedition operating in France.’' We will now briefly examine how', in possession
of this position and experience, Sir William Babtie carried out his responsibility for properly
equipping the Mesopotamian Expedition in regard to medical requirements.
40. In one sense, the numerous sanitary and precautionary requisitions of Colonel
Hehir, which we have already detailed, are a measure of Sir William Babtie’s omissions.
We have seen that during the first months of the campaign, Colonel Hehir was forced to
wire to India for sun glasses, anti-toxin, mosquito-nets, spine-pads, &c., &c. Though
it is true that Sir William Babtie was not technically responsible for the actual provision of
all of these requisites, yet it is quite clear that they were essential to the maintenance of the
health of the troops, and in our opinion Sir William Babtie should have made it his duty to
have impressed upon the Quartermaster General’s or other Departments concerned the
necessity for providing well beforehand, these and other medical ancillaries in which the
expedition is proved to have been deficient. He did not do this, with the result that many
of these essentials did not reach the troops in sufficient time and sufficient quantities.
41. In regard to the rations of the Indian troops we consider that an even more severe
comment should be passed on the Director of Medical Services’ omission. In an official
report to the D.M.S. in India dated April 8th, 1915, Colonel Hehir reports a small out
break of scurvy amongst the Indian troops, and adds as follows
“ I am of opinion that the present field service diet of Indian troops and followers has certain intrinsic
defects, and it is suggested as desirable that the whole question should be reconsidered and the dietary in some
respects reconstructed. An enquiry into the caloric value, vitamine content and anti-scorbutic attributes
of the present dietary appears to be indicated. The only vegetable now allowed is 2 ounces of potatoes
and the only fresh meat 28 ounces a week. It is very doubtful whether this authorised ration, if not supple
mented by other vegetables and more meat, is sufficient to prevent scurvy. Cases of scurvy have invariably
occurred whenever campaigns have lasted longer than four months, and the prevalence of the disease has then
▼aried with the extent to which the ration could be supplemented by fresh vegetables and fresh meat obtained
locally.”
42. Sir William Babtie informed us : “ As regards rations, I brought up the question
of rationing the troops at the Commander-in-Chief’s conference, and an additional ration
to that which was hitherto in force for field service in India was sanctioned.” We
have not been able to obtain any confirmation of this assertion, and if the suggestion ever
emerged from the phase of discussion into the reality of action, we can only suppose that it
related merely to modifications of the extras which the Commanding Officer on the spot
is empowered to sanction. It will be observed that Colonel Hehir’s letter is an indictment
of the whole constitution of the Indian ration. In the papers which have been laid before
ns by Sir B. Duff from the Quartermaster-General’s branch in India it is definitely stated
“ Until March, 1916, no suggestion was made that for Indians the authorised ration was
not entirely suited to the conditions of Mesopotamian Service,” and we gather from the
same document that the ration had, prior to that date, remained unaltered since it was
slightly modified in 1912. If Surgeon-General Babtie, with the knowledge that he must
have had of the proneness of Indian troops to scurvy, had authoritatively pressed Colonel
Hehir's suggestions upon the Commander-in-Chief and the Quartermaster-General in
India, it is difficult to suppose that a general improvement of the Indian ration would not
have been sanctioned. As it was, the ration remained generally as fixed in 1912, and though
some additions were made in May, 1916, in the summer of the same year a very serious
outbreak of scurvy occurred amongst the Indian troops in Mesopotamia, resulting in some