'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎45r] (89/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
37
E. Responsibility of Secretary of State, Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief.
some person whose character and position ensure that they deserve attention. These
obvious considerations seem to have been absent from Sir Beauchamp Duff’s mind; Even
in giving evidence before us he hardly seemed to feel the crushing significance of the fact
that the rumours he disdained were true. It ought, in our judgment, to be deeply
impressed on all men of high official authority, that obstinate and exaggerated incredulity
about defects and failures in the administration, over which they have control, is in itself
a serious and mischievous fault.
96. The language of Sir Beauchamp Duff’s letter of December 30th to the \ iceroy
reads very unpleasantly in the light of our knowledge of the sufferings that the troops
had endured after Ctesiphon. But it is difficult to say how far his blindness to the
sufferings of the troops after Ctesiphon delayed the introduction of effectual improvements.
All that it is safe to affirm is that since, when the truth was fully disclosed, improvement
was slowly but gradually effected^—the sooner the full disclosure had been achieved, the
sooner improvement would have begun.
97. The enquiry, to which Sir Beauchamp Duff at the instance of the Viceroy had
assented, was first intended to be a mission entrusted to Lord Chelmsford and Surgeon-
General MacNeece to go to Mesopotamia and look into the state of matters there. But
when it became confidentially known to the Viceroy and Sir Beauchamp Duff that Lord
Chelmsford was to be Lord Hardinge’s successor in the V iceroyalty, it was naturally
decided not to send him on a mission to Mesopotamia, but to send Surgeon-General Mac
Neece alone. The exact nature of his mission is not clear, but in any case it was no ade
quate fulfilment of Sir Beauchamp Duff's promise to the Viceroy that he would certainly
have the whole matter enquired into and reported on, and would leave no stone unturned
to get at the actual facts.” Sir Beauchamp Duff’s telegram to Sir J. Nixon as to this was
in these terms : “ Surgeon-General MacNeece is being sent to confer with you on the general
question of medical requirements and sanitation of your force and the co-ordination of the
medical requirements of other forces with those of Force ‘ D.’ These instructions seem
to direct Surgeon-General MacNeece to consult rather than to make any thorough in
vestigation. With this vague commission Surgeon-General MacNeece was sent to Meso
potamia in January, 1916. He did not go further north than Basra, and the enquiries
made at Basra do not appear to have been of a very searching kind. Perhaps in conse
quence of his instructions the Report he sent in gave a very inadequate presentation of
what had actually taken place. He said in evidence before us that he supplemented his
report when he returned to Delhi by conversations with the Commander-in-Chief. How-*
ever this may be, the upshot was that the Commander-in-Chief came to the conclusion
that further enquiry was called for.
98. While Surgeon-General MacNeece’s enquiry was going on matters were getting
worse in Mesopotamia. The sufferings after the January battles were worse than those
endured after Ctesiphon, and it seems that the rumours of what had been endured became
stronger and stronger. At last it was decided to hold a new and more responsible
enquiry and to entrust it to Sir William Vincent and Major-General A. H. Bingley. On
February 22nd, 1916, Sir Beauchamp Duff telegraphed to Sir Percy Lake, who had taken
over the command of the Mesopotamia Force, as follows :—
Terrible stories are being received here as to treatment of wounded after Sheikh Saad and later battles
and total want of proper medical arrangements. I fear a serious scandal is impending and that I shall be com
pelled to send* out a commission to enquire. It is imperative that all this should be improved before the next
fight.
Accordingly the Vineent-Bing’ey Commission was appointed on March 2nd, but after
all that had occurred it is surprising that its terms of reference should have been at first
limited by the Commander-in-Chief, so as to exclude all enquiry into the Battle of Ctesiphon.
99. Our conclusions in regard to the responsibility of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , the V iceroy and
the Commander-in-Chief, may be summarised as follows :—
{a) The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting
the general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of re
trenchment, and provision was accordingly not made for such an expedition as
that to Mesopotamia. For the purpose of this part of our subject the importance
of this policy lies in the consequent unpreparedness of the medical services in
India, which was the original source of their failure in the Mesopotamian Campaign.
Further, the deficient organisation of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and the want of a Medical