'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎47r] (93/248)

PART X.—MEDICAL BREAKDOWN.
91
, F. Supplementary.
by the pessimistic tone of a demi-official letter from Sir A. Keogh to Surgeon-General
MacNeece in August, 1915. But it can hardly be urged that so vital an omission by the
Indian Government in a matter for which they were responsible can be excused on the
grounds of chance expressions in a semi-private letter. Sir Alfred Keogh, who was
Director-General of Medical Services, War Office, himself gave evidence before us
that during 1916 all demands made upon him were met, and that he “ could have complied
with any demands made upon him at any time since the beginning of the Mesopotamian
Expedition.'’ Moreover, the only demand made to England for medical personnel before
the battle of Ctesiphon (viz., on July 4th, 1915, for 46 R.A.M.C. officers) was promptly
met, although the demand itself was couched in a form which gave no adequate indica
tion of the deficiencies existing in Mesopotamia. We feel therefore that a grave
responsibility rests with the Indian Government for not formally and fully placing the
deficiencies in medical personnel and equipment before the home authorities and requesting
assistance on an adequate scale.
Voluntary Aid from England.
110. We note with satisfaction the anxiety of various non-official bodies to help in
Mesopotamia, and our evidence testifies to the liberality of the British and Indian com
munities in India, the activity of the Indian Branch of the St. John Ambulance Association,
and the good work done by the Indian Soldiers’ Fund, and other bodies on similar lines.
Some of our evidence on this point suggests that offers of voluntary aid were not too
well received, but Lord Hardinge strongly maintains the contrary view. One regrettable
failure to profit from voluntary assistance there can be no doubt about. The joint War
Committee of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John in London have been
active in Mesopotamia since the beginning of 1916: on July 17th, 1915, however, they
cabled to Sir John Nixon :—
Can British Red Cross help in any way with hospital supplies for your force ?
Acceptance was confined to two petrol-driven motor launches. The offer was repeated
^ on December 28th, and a reply sent:—
Nothing required at present. If anything needed in future will not hesitate to ask you.
A startling answer in view of the recent breakdown after Ctesiphon.
0
Shortage of ordinary River Transport and Extent to which it excuses the Medical Breakdown.
111. There are passages in the evidence of Lord Hardinge, Surgeon-General Hathaway
and other responsible witnesses which might lead to the inference that the medical
breakdown in Mesopotamia was due to the shortage of ordinary river transport, for which,
of course, the medical authorities were not responsible. If this were true, it w*ould
follow that the medical authorities must be relieved of blame for the results of the break
down. We cannot agree with such a contention. No doubt the medical work, in
common with every other branch of administration, was seriously hampered by
the lack of liver transport, and this lack may have been the immediate cause of some
of the sufferings of the wounded on particular occasions, as, for example, when, early in
1916, it was found impossible to send up to the front with sufficient promptitude ambu
lances and transport which were actually at Basra. But many of the principal factors in
the sufferings of the sick and wounded were not, or need not have been, materially affected
b> the shoi tage of uvei steamers. It was not such shortage which prevented sufficient
doctors, assistant surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons being sent to the expedition up to
the end of 1915, and yet the insufficiency of medical personnel was one of the worst features
in the hardships, not only on the battle-field, but also on the journey down the river,
notably after the retreat from Ctesiphon. It was not the shortage of river transport which
prevented the expedition from being supplied in 1915 with sufficient hospitals: nor, as
the Viceroy himself pointed out, could the insufficiency of river transport justify the
omission to send to the front a proper supply of such unbulky necessaries as bandages
dressings and drugs.
112. In our opinion, the known shortage of ordinary river transport, if anything, aggra
vates rather than palliates the omissions of the medical authorities. If the ordinary boat-
T serv i c e had been adequate for the sick, thefe might have been some excuse for omittiru?
to provide special river hospital steamers, but the ordinary boat service was known to be
inadequate.
(C 48-176) M 9