'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎58v] (116/248)

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PART XII.—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
A.— Findings and Conclusions.
To these fifth and sixth main causes may be added in respect to the operations in
January 1916 :—
(e) The absence of the medical and supply establishments of the 7th Division.
(/) The premature efforts to relieve Kut in consequence of the erroneous estimate
of supplies in that place.
17. As to personal responsibility the Vincent-Bingley Commission found :—
That a grave responsibility for that part of the suffering which resulted from avoidable circumstances
rests with the Senior Medical Officer of the Force, Surgeon-General G. H. Hathaway,, and with General Sir John
Nixon, the General Officer Commanding the Force, from April 9th, 1915, to January 19th, 1916. General
Hathaway did not represent with sufficient promptitude and force the needs of the services for which he was
responsible, and in particular failed to urge the necessity for adequate and suitable transport for the sick and
wounded with that insistency which the situation demanded. General Nixon did not, in our opinion, appreciate
the conditions which would necessarily arise if provision for the sick and wounded of his force were not made
on a more liberal scale.
We endorse the finding as regards Surgeon-General Hathaway who in our judgment
showed himself unfit for the high administrative office whic-h he held.
We may add, however, as regards River and Land Transport, that while it was the duty
of Surgeon-General Hathaway to urge its necessity, it was acfuolly the duty of the Quarter
master General’s Department and of Sir John Nixon’s staff to see that it vas provided.
So far as Sir John Nixon is concerned, however, we think that he was throughout
solicitous as to the condition of the wounded. The main mistake he made, was to rely
too absolutely on the statements made to him by his Deputy-Director of Medical Service,
Surgeon-General Hathaway ; to that extent he may be blamed, but he stands, so far as
responsibility is concerned, in a* very different position from that occupied by Surgeon-
General Hathaway.
18. The officer directly responsible for the deficiencies of medical provision in
Mesopotamia, is however, the Director of Medical Services, India. This appoint
ment was held at the beginning of the war by Surgeon-General Sir William Babtie,
who held the office between March, 1914, and June, 1915, but was away from India
for six weeks in February and March, 1915. He was succeeded by Surgeon-General J. G.
MacNeece on July 8th, 1915, and the latter proceeded home on sick leave on April 15th,
1916. Sir William Babtie in his evidence before us impressed us as an officer of ability and
knowledge, but we do not think that he brought these qualities sufficiently to bear upon the
task before him. He accepted obviously insufficient medical provision without protest,
and without any adequate effort to improve it. He cannot therefore be held blameless.
Surgeon-General MacNeece did not give evidence before the Yincent-Bingley
Commission, but he appeared before us. He was, in our opinion, an officer thoroughly
desirous of fulfilling the duties assigned to him ; but he was a man of advancing years and
diminishing strength, unequal to the position he was called upon to fill, and his admini
stration appears to us to show no signs of the vigour and efficiency that were required.
19. We find that:—
(a) The Home Government agreed with the Indian Government in limiting the
general military preparations of India before the war in the interests of retrenchment,
and provision was accordingly not made for such an expedition as that to Mesopo
tamia. The limitation of medical preparation and the low standard of medical
treatment in the Indian Army at the outbreak of war were the natural outcome of
this policy, which was pursued for many years and was in force right up to the date
of the war.
(b) The private letters of the Secretary of State to the Viceroy showed an
earnest and continuous anxiety as to the condition of the wounded, and the only
comment that can be made upon the Secretary of State’s procedure is that he did not
fully utilize the official powers at his disposal for the purpose of forcing at an earlier
period an investigation into the treatment of the wounded in Mesopotamia.
(c) To Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, as Viceroy, belongs the general responsi
bility attaching to his position as the head of the Indian Government, to which had
been entrusted the management of the expedition, including the provision of medical
dervices. In regard to the actual medical administration he appears to us to have
shown throughout the utmost goodwill, but considering the paramount authority
his office, his action was not sufficiently strenuous and peremptory.