'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎59v] (118/248)

116 PART XIL—FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
A. Findings and Conclusions.
Nature of Criticisms on Indian Government.
The criticisms which it has been our duty to make upon the Government of India
divide themselves into two categories :—
26. Those relating to the error of judgment shown by their advocacy of an
advance to Baghdad in October, 1915. In this mistake other authorities participated
and we are not disposed to say more on this matter than that, lamentable as were
the consequences, the blunder was one, which is not uncommon in a protracted cam
paign.
27. Our second criticisms are of a different character. They relate to the failure
adequately to “ minister to the wants of the forces employed in Mesopotamia.” This
failure was persistent and continuous and practically covered the whole of the period
during which the Indian Government were entrusted with the management of the
expedition. With the knowledge of the facts which we now possess and of the extent
and scope of the preparations of the War Office since they undertook the manage
ment of the campaign, it is impossible to refrain from serious censure of the Indian Govern
ment for the lack of knowledge and foresight shown in the inadequacy of their preparations
and for the lack of readiness to recognise and supply deficiencies. They ought to have
known, and with proper touch with the expedition they could have known, what were
its wants and requirements. It is true that their military system of administration was
cumbrous and inept. It was, however, within the power of the Viceroy and the Com-
mander-in-Chief to have established a more effective procedure and a closer touch with
the expedition itself.
' B. Recommendations.
In the enquiry which we have made and the evidence which we have obtained
we have received much information as regards the inner working of the highest branches
of administration of the Indian Government both in England and India. We assume that
it will not be outside our duty if we briefly refer to them for the purpose of making certain
recommendations with a view to preventing a recurrence of the want of foresight and
of efficiency, which our investigations have revealed.
Relations between Secretary of State and the Viceroy and Their Respective:
Councils.
28. We have more than once alluded to the great increase in the number of private
telegrams exchanged on official business between the Secretary of State for India and the
Viceroy. Whether intentionally or not. this method of communication must more or less
deprive the Councils of both these high officials of the powers which, under Acts of
Parliament, they have in common with the Secretary of State and Viceroy, been given
in the government and administration of India. The Secretary of State informed us that
he proposed to make some change so as to limit the scope and purport of such private
communications. Some change is certainly constitutionally required, as the present
practice seems to us to conflict with the intentions of Parliament. If the Councils of the
Secretary of State and Viceroy are to be dispossessed of their old powers, such a change
should be effected openly under an Act of Parliament and not by a change in the internal
procedure of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . Independently of the question of the legality of the present
practice, the increase in the use of private telegrams must tend to accumulate work into
the hands of an already heavily worked Viceroy. In our judgment, the aim of adminis
trative reform in India, certainly in the military departments, should be a devolution of
responsibilities and duties from the over-centralised bureaucracy of the Supreme Govern
ment at Simla.
Military Administration.
29. It is clear that the combination of the duties of Commander-in-Chief in India
and Military Member of Council cannot adequately be performed by any one man in time
of war, and that the existing organisation is at once over-centralised at its head, and cum
brous in its duality below. This was fully admitted by the Secretary of State for India, Mr.
Chamberlain, and he gave us reason to believe that changes will be made enabling the
official who ostensibly holds the post of Commander-in-Chief adequately to perform his
functions of personal inspection, and investigation of the efficiency and requirements of