'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎62v] (124/248)

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have been at that time; but it should have been directed by the authorities in India
rather towards obtaining a smaller and efficient force than towards keeping the force large
but starving it of modern military accessories. It was this latter policy, pursued by India
for some vears previous to the war, that made the Army as ill-found as indicated m my
colleagues’ report; and for this policy it was hardly the Government in England that was
responsible. Further, the responsibility of the Indian Government in this respect is a
responsibility, not for an error, but for reluctance to interfere with the 'vested interests of
a corporation of their servants.
Personnel and Training.
7. If the equipment of the Indian Army when war began was inadequate and out
of date, strictures hardly less severe must be passed upon the personnel. Evidence laid
before us has shown that the standards for the higher commands have deteriorated since
the Boer War, and the exceptionally long list of Anglo-Indian generals who have been
relieved of their commands in the field cannot be entirely set down to the normal retirement
of the aged in a war that demands young men. Nor are Mid-\ ictorian manoeuvres, carried
on without such modern accessories of warfare as mechanical transport, air paik, wireless
telegraphy, barbed wire, flares, entrenching tools, with wholly inadequate telephones, and
with two-wheeled hospitai tongas drawn by bullocks, likely to be of much help as training.
And a considerable part of the Army in Southern India seem to have no manoeuvres at
all, even of this unsatisfactorv nature.
Reserves.
8. The same feeling of security and eastern lassitude that was content with an Army
of this description led to the acceptance of a system of reserves of officers and men which
must in any case have completely broken down directly war came. The reserve system
for the Native Army (rank and file) seems to have been well adapted to foster tne loyalty
. of political pensioners, but the old men who returned to the colours were unsu'table for
soldiers; a reserve scheme should be concerned principally with military efficiency.
A reserve scheme for white officers had been drawn up, but as little or no pecuniary N
inducement was held out to young white civilians to join the Indian Army Reserve, only
43 such officers existed at the beginning of the war. The Indian Government have since
had to draw over 2,600 Indian Army Reserve officers out of India and to give them such
hasty training as was possible.
If no provision was made for a reserve of white officers there was the less excuse for
allowing old-fashioned prejudices against colour to stand in the way of the formation of
an adequately trained cadre of Indian officers which the native rulers of India would willingly
have supplied. From evidence tendered to us it is evident that a change in this direction
would not be unwelcome to the English officers in the Indian Army.
Value o/ Indian Army.
9. In spite of being ill-equipped, ill-trained, and resting on paper reserves, the
regimental officers and the rank and file of the Indian Army have fought in a manner to
show that, with proper drafts and properly trained and equipped, they would have few or
no superiors. The victories at Kut and Ctesiphon—at Ctesiphon where 35 per cent, of
the whole army fell on the field and yet that army was victorious, as well as the bloody
attacks at Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. and Sannah that were made again and again over an open plain through
deep mud in the face of hopeless odds and almost certain failure, have led to an entire
reconsideration of the value of the Indian Army. They are worth something better than
management and control by eastern lethargy and bureaucratic incompetence. There is
no fault to find with the younger men of the Anglo-Indian Aimy, but they lose stamina
with long residence in the East.
The good change in the Control.
10. The success that has attended the Army of Mesopotamia since the conduct of
the campaign was taken over by the War Office, the change that has come over the feeding,
the cheerfulness, the morale, of that Army, are palpable to the public eye. that this is
due in part to the energy of the War Office, and to the excellent officers they have sent out
I should be the last to deny. But when all allowance has been made for this, the change^
cannot but be largely accounted for by the previous attitude of the Indian Government
towards the expedition, an attitude which they adopted not only to the expedition but
towards the war as a whole.