'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎66v] (132/248)

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130
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE ATTITUDE OF THE
INDIAN GOVERNMENT.
Effect of want of willingness to help.
39. I cannot resist the conclusion that the above evidence points to a want of willing
ness to help on the part of the Indian Government—that is on the part of Lord Hardmge
and Sir Beauchamp Duff. That this unwillingness affected adversely the expedition
to Mesopotamia is obvious. Had they thrown themselves heart and soul m to getting
India to do all that was humanly possible both in men and material the whole course
of the war might have been altered. That was not done even m this country at first,
but the attitude of the Indian Government prevented the effort being made m the sprmg
of 1915 as was done here, and it prevented the success of their own expedition m Meso
potamia.
The Defence of the Government. •
40 The answer made by the Government of India to this charge is that the dangers
in India were such that what might seem obstructiveness was m reality honest, if mistaken
caution. There was acutely present to their minds danger from (a) mutiny, (fr) a native
* rising in India, (c) an invasion from Afghanistan or from the frontier tribes.
The Danger to India. ‘ ^ TT .. A
41. It is natural to assume that, since the attitude taken up by Lord l atdmge fmd
the Conunander-in-Chief has come under open criticism at home, ^ery efiort will We
been made to colour the risks in India as darkly as possible The Secretary of State has
nrenared and put before us a Memorandum detailing as fully as possible the mte
troubles which India has gone through. It is difficult to summarise, and the whole c anno
now be published. There have been more than the usual number of dacoities , the e
have been curious semi-religious theories about the Germans m us ^ ave fe^
murdered by Mohamedans ; there have been rumours of gun-run gP’ J j
e ot wind of some general troop trouble, and a native post or two seem doubtfully to have
thrown off their aflegiance-hss than a dozen men. But there has been no armed
and the capture of 50 revolvers by revolutionaries is singled out as the “ ost "
incident No mutiny has taken place m India sufficiently serious to call foi disarm;
or for corporate punishment of any unit. Germans were not interned in India till long f
they were interned here in England, which omission testifies against any realfear^f serious
internal trouble. The Amir has shown 'great loyalty, and ^ ' iv TW ealualties On
which Sir Beauchamp Duff bore witness actually caused only 338 casualty Un
July 2nd 1915 after the period in which reluctance to help was most marked, Sir
Beauchamp cabled to Lord Kitchener, “ Though I have had to meet three hea^ ra^,
the frontier has been fairly quiet.” The other raids, such as they were, took place sub
sequently.
The Seriousness of the Risk. _ . . 1 . T
42. Therefore it was not actual trouble but possible dangers to British rule m India
behind which the Administration must shelter itself. Of these possible dangers both
Lord Kitchener and General Sir Edmund Barrow should, from their long residence in
India, be well able to judge ; yet no administrators are more severe m then criticism of
the attitude of the Indian Government than these two. I here is always danger in
world : it is a question of degree.
The Council not consulted. . . .
43. Had the possible dangers been of a serious character, it is to me mconceiva e
that the Viceroy should never have seen fit to consult his Council on the relative urge cy
of the demands made on the Indian Army by India and by the Home Government. Real
danger in India must have entailed the consulting of the Council more especially m . arc ,
1915 , when the peremptory order was issued from Whitehall. That they, were not consulted
is evidence that the danger did not then exist to the degree now put forwaid.
Suppression of a Modern Rebellion.
44: Danger to British rule in India from a rising of the people, or from a mutiny,
has obviously become much less since the year 1857. Railways, the telegraph, the heho
wireless telegraphy, motor transport, magazine rifles, machine guns aeroplanes, armoure
cars, all these costly developments of modern warfare are beyond the reach of insurgents,