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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎71r] (141/248)

The record is made up of 1 volume (122 folios). It was created in 1906-1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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139
rushed after dark the same day by the 13th Division.
Our losses were not heavy considering the stubbornness
of the enemy’s resistance and the nature of the terrain.
43. Attacks on the Sannaiyat position. Battle of Beit
Aiessa .—Meanwhile the 3rd Division had gained ground
at Abu Roman on the right bank of the Tigris, and by
April 7th was able to enfilade the Turkish position at
Sannaiyat on the opposite shore. After a heavy bom
bardment, the attack of this position was made early
on that day by the 7th Division, and again on the 9th
by the 13th Division, but both attempts failed. Operations
were much hampered by floods and bad weather. Our
losses on these occasions were very heavy.* On the 12th
further progress was made on the right bank. The
enemy’s advanced lines were forced back from 11 to 3
miles, and our troops had to wade across an inundated
belt from 500 to 1,200 yards wide, extending from the
Tigris to the Umm-el-Brahm marshes. The advance was
continued on the 15th, when more ground was gained
and some of the enemy’s forward trenches taken. On
the 17th this success was followed by the capture of the
Beit Aieesa position. The Turks lost heavily, and a
number of prisoners were captured. That evening the
Turks made a formidable counter-attack with some
10,000 men. The attack began at about 7 p.m., having
been preceded by a bombardment, and continued
throughout the night till 4.30 a.m. The enemy came
on in dense formations and penetrated a part of our
front. Six distinct assaults in mass were launched on
one of our brigades. Within 500 yards of its front
from 1,200 to 1,500 dead Turks were counted. Their
losses in killed alone on the night of the 17th-18th are
estimated at over 3,000. The number of wounded was
no doubt proportionately high, and close on 400 prisoners
were taken. The Turkish casualties on this occasion
are believed to have been greater than in any of the
previous actions for the relief of Kut. Our own losses
from April 17th to 19th were 120 killed and 1,200 wounded
or missing.
44. Reneived attacks on the Sannaiyat position .—After a
systematic bombardment the Turkish position at Sannaiyat
was again attacked on the 22nd. Owing to floods, which
restricted the front, only one brigade could be utilised.
The leading troops penetrated the enemy’s first and
second lines through bog and submerged trenches, and
a few got up into the third line. They were, however,
unable to maintain their position under the enemy’s
counter-attacks, and other brigades, pushed up on the
right and left to reinforce, failed to reach their objectives,
which had to be approached over flooded and boggy
ground swept by fire. Although the attempt failed, the
enemy lost heavily when they left their trenches to
counter-attack, owing to the accurate fire of our machine
guns in action on the right bank. Our losses at Sannaiyat
between the 21st and the 24th amounted to 93 killed
and 1,035 wounded or missing. Our total casualties in
the attempt to relieve Kut amounted to 21,973.
45. Capitulation of Kut .—An effort was made on the
night of April 24th to send the steamer “ Julnar ” through
to Kut, laden with supplies. Though carried out with
the utmost gallantry the attempt failed, the vessel being
stopped by an obstacle and forced aground near Magasis,
about 4 miles from Kut. On April 29th the garrison of
Kut capitulated after a siege of five months, and about
2,750 British and 6,500 Indian soldiers became prisoners
of war. The garrison had been put on half rations in
January, and since February had subsisted on a meagre
allowance of horseflesh and barley bread. The last day’s
ration was consumed on the day of >the surrender. By
an arrangement made with Khalil Bey, the Turkish
Commander, sick and wounded British and Indian
officers and men, who were in hospital when the capitu
lation took place, were exchanged for an equivalent
number of Turkish prisoners. Excellent arrangements
were made for their evacuation down river, and within
a few days of their leaving Kut they were en route to
India on well-equipped hospital ships, where they received
every possible care and the comforts which they had
been so long denied.
* The total casualties, including killed, wounded and
missing, were 4,036 between April 4th and 8th, and
1,971 on April 9th.
46. Medical arrangements of the campaign .—Having
given an epitome of the history of the campaign, we
proceed to discuss the main question referred to us for
enquiry, namely, the adequacy or inadequacy of the
arrangements made for the collection, treatment and
removal of sick and wounded during these operations,
the causes of any defects found to exist, and the results
which ensued therefrom.
47. We think it expedient to state our answer to this
broad question at the outset. We are constrained to
say that in our opinion these arrangements were mani
festly inadequate and that, in consequence, the sick
and wounded underwent great suffering which might
have been avoided by better medical organisation.
Many of the defects which contributed to this result
were of a general character, and have affected the whole
or a great part of the campaign, and it will be convenient
to discuss them before examining those which only
affected particular phases of the operations.
48. Hospital river steamers .—The first deficiency to
which we desire to draw attention is the absence of any
river steamers equipped for the transport of sick and
wounded, and of any separate medical establishments
for such vessels. We believe that this has had more
prejudicial results than almost any other defect in the
organisation. It has constantly delayed evacuation,
dislocated medical arrangements and caused great
suffering and injury. So long as operations were confined
to the immediate vicinity of Basra there was no need
for any such transport; but directly columns advanced
up the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun the necessity of
some means of speedily evacuating the sick and wounded
by water became apparent. In December, 1914, the
expeditionary force advanced to Kurna, 40 miles up the
Shatt-el-Arab from Basra. In February there were
operations up the Karun river as far as Ahwaz, 139 miles
from Basra. In May the campaign had extended up
the Tigris to Amara, 135 miles from Basra; and in
July, 1915, a force was despatched up the Euphrates
to Nasariyeh. From all these columns the sick and
wounded, the numbers of which were large, were evacuated,
either in ordinary river steamers not properly fitted up
for hospital work, or in mahailas, the requisite personnel
and equipment being improvised from medical units on
the spot. The culminating point was reached at the
battle of Ctesiphon in November, 1915, and in the actions
on the Tigris in January, 1916, when the number of
wounded was very large.
49. It must be borne in mind that when these latter
actions took place the medical personnel and equipment
were insufficient for the due care of the wounded in the
hospitals and field ambulances, and that from an early
period of the war the number of river steamers and
barges available for purely military requirements was
entirely inadequate. It was, however, from this deficient
staff and equipment, and from a steamer service not
intended for the purpose, that some means of evacuating
the wounded to the base had to be improvised. This
journey was not a matter of a few hours, but of many
days. Some vessels after the battle of Ctesiphon were,
in fact, delayed a fortnight en route by various causes.
It was, therefore, the more necessary that proper accom
modation should be provided for the patients, and that
the supply of medical and subordinate personnel, and of
surgical and medical stores and comforts, should be
complete. We have however ample evidence, much of it of
a terrible kind, to show that the failure to provide
proper hospital steamers and the necessary medical
personnel and equipment caused great suffering. I he
steamers and barges employed for evacuating the wounded
on these and other occasions had often been used for
carrying animals to the front, and the decks were in
some cases soaked with urine and dirt. 1 here was no
time to clean or disinfect them effectually, and they had
to be used in this condition. They were not fitted nith
any effective protection from the sun or rain, and on
many occasions the patients were for days together wet
through. The arrangements for the supply of drinking
water were very defective. The latrines were insufficient
and insanitary. The vessels were overcrowded. The
patients were not, save in few cases, provided w ith
camp beds, and, according to the evidence, even rough
mattresses stuffed with hay were not often available. On
particular occasions even the supply of blankets gave

About this item

Content

A signed proof, folios 1-100, plus additional material, folios 101-124. The cover bears the signature of Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State. The report has been annotated in blue pencil at various points.

Contents:

  • 'Part I. Preface.
  • 'Part II. Origin of Mesopotamia [Iraq] Expedition.'
  • 'Part III. Advance from Basra to Kurna.'
  • 'Part IV. The Advance to Amara [Al-'Amārah] and Kut [Al-Kūt].'
  • 'Part V. Correspondence and Telegrams as to Advance on Baghdad.'
  • 'Part VI. The Advance from Kut to Ctesiphon.'
  • 'Part VII. Operations for Relief of Kut.'
  • 'Part VIII. Armament, Equipment, Reinforcements, &c.'
  • 'Part IX. Transport.'
  • 'Part X. Medical Breakdown.'
  • 'Part XI. Causes Contributing to the Errors of Judgement and Shortcomings of Responsible Authorities.'
  • 'Part XII. Findings and Conclusions. Recommendations.'
  • 'Separate Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP.'
  • 'Appendix I. Vincent-Bingley Report.'
  • 'Appendix II. Memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Duff.'
  • 'Appendix III. Colonel Hehir's Account of the Siege of Kut-el-Amara.'

Additional material:

  • Folio 101. Manuscript note [by Arthur Hirtzel] on net military expenditure.
  • Folios 102-109. Copy of the East India (Army Administration), Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army in India , 1906.
  • Folios 110-115. Manuscript notes, titled 'Suggested redraft & amplification of second half of parag 1' [unknown hand].
  • Folio 116. A clipping from the Daily Telegraph , Wednesday 4 July 1917, featuring an article titled 'Mesopotamia. Ex-Viceroy's Statement. The Medical Breakdown.'
  • Folios 117-124. An expanded typescript version of Hirtzel's manuscript notes (folio 101).
Extent and format
1 volume (122 folios)
Arrangement

A table of contents can be found at folio 4v.

An index can be found at folios 93-97.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 124; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is present in parallel between ff 110-115; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled. Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence. The volume comprises a stitched pamphlet, and other stitched and loose-leaf material.

Written in
English in Latin script
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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎71r] (141/248), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/257, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036338403.0x00008e> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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