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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎73r] (145/248)

The record is made up of 1 volume (122 folios). It was created in 1906-1918. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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143
V
(C 48—176)
T 2
subordinates as against an authorised scale of 48, for that
number of beds. It can therefore safely be said that the
officers in charge of the various hospitals have had, from
an early stage in the campaign, to contend with great
difficulties. Not only has it been impossible to secure
proper buildings for the accommodation of all their
patients, and difficult, in hospitals outside Basra, to
obtain the necessary drugs and appliances with reasonable
expedition, but there has been a consistent shortage in
the personnel necessary to treat the number of sick and
wounded. This shortage has been particularly felt in
respect of assistant surgeons, sub-assistant surgeons and
* menial staff. We believe that the patients, especially
in the British general hospitals, have suffered less trom
these inadequate arrangements than might have been
expected, owing to the great resourcefulness, energy and
devotion to duty of the medical personnel and subordinate
staff. We cannot speak too highly of the efforts made
by the available staff in all the hospitals to cope with
the very difficult situation with which they were faced.
At the same time, the evidence before us indicates that
on particular occasions, despite the strenuous efforts of
the hospital staff, the medical personnel available to treat
the patients and to see to their comfort, especially in the
Indian general hospital was so deficient that the patients
underwent considerable discomfort, and that cases which
required constant medical attention and nursing did not
obtain them.
66. The deficiencies in stationary and clearing hospitals
have been equally great. The Indian regulations contem
plate the location of stationary hospitals at all small
posts where general hospitals are not required; but
during the whole of 1915 there was only one stationary
hospital* in Mesopotamia, and the work which should
have been done by stationary hospitals at various posts
on the Tigris, Euphrates and Karun, such as Ali-al-
Gharbi, Nasariyeh, and Ahwaz, has been done by field
ambulances. Indeed at Kurna, where the daily number
of sick was for some time large, there was for a great part
of the year not even a field ambulance to receive or accom
modate the patients, and regimental medical officers had
to make the best arrangements they could. Similarly,
in the case of clearing hospitals, the supply of these units
has never been sufficient, with the result that hospitals of
this class at the front have been frequently overcrowded,
and that it has been necessary to supplement them by
field ambulances.
67. Dislocation of the medical organisation. —Another
consequence of the deficiency in hospital establishments
has been a general dislocation of the medical organisation
of the force. The Field Service Regulations contemplate
the following medical units for the treatment of the sick
and wounded:—
(1) Regimental medical officers.
(2) Field ambulances, which are divided into bearer
and tent sub-divisions.
(3) Clearing hospitals.
(4) Stationary hospitals.
(5) General hospitals.
The duties of each of these units are described in the
regulations on the subject. General hospitals are,
according to these regulations, large hospitals placed at
the base, or at any other post where they are required,
for the treatment of severe and prolonged cases. They
are equipped for the medical treatment and comfort of
all classes of cases, and have the requisite stocks of beds,
blankets, cooking utensils, crockery, stores and various
appliances. Stationary hospitals are small units, generally
posted at places on the line of communications where
general hospitals are not needed, and are, according to the
regulations, equipped to deal with 25, or in cases of
emergency, 50 patients. Clearing hospitals are intended
for the temporary reception of sick and wounded, pending
and during evacuation from the front. Their functions
are similar to those of the tent sub-divisions of a field
ambulance, but on a larger scale, and they form the
central point on which the collecting zone converges and
from which the evacuating and distributing zones diverge.
They are normally located at an advanced base and should
* Excluding the Bengal Stationary Hospital, which
is maintained by private subscriptions and was being used
as a General Hospital.
be pushed up, so as to be in reach of the field ambulances»
Field ambulances are supposed to accompany the force
to which they are attached, to be in close touch with it
during action, and to evacuate the sick and wounded
without delay to the clearing hospitals. All of these
units are equipped only for the particular duties which
they are intended to perform. The supply of stores,
appliances, clothing and furniture in field ambulances
and clearing hospitals is, for obvious reasons, not large.
The organisation prescribed in the regulations has,however,
been in great measure abandoned in Mesopotamia. On the
Tigris front there were, during the operations in April,
1916, two clearing hospitals only to clear the whole of the
wounded of approximately four divisions, while a third
hospital of this kind was acting as a general hospital at the
base. At Nasariyeh, from July, 1915, to April, 1916, no
hospital of any kind was established, and the whole
medical work was done by the field ambulances In
consequence of this dislocation, the work of clearing and
stationary hospitals has constantly been undertaken by
field ambulances which are not equipped for this purpose,
and which cannot be called upon to do the work of hospitals
without detriment to their legitimate duties. Complaints
of this misuse of the various medical units have been very
frequent and we think justified. It is not possible to
treat patients suffering from disease or wounds satis
factorily, for any prolonged period, in a field ambulance
to which no beds and a very limited amount of clothing,
cooking utensils, crockery, linen, blankets and medical
appliances are supplied, and in which the strength of the
subordinate staff appointed to see to the comfort of the
sick is very limited. The same remarks apply mutatis
mutandis also to clearing hospitals, which are only fitted
out for the temporary accommodation of patients.
68. Responsibility for deficiencies. —As to the responsi
bility for these deficiencies, we think that the causa causans
is the insufficiency of the medical establishment in India
to meet the demands of a great war, in which troops from
India have been largely employed overseas. There is
abundant evidence that the available supply of medical
officers and subordinates in India, including those in civil
employment, has been very largely drawn on to bring
medical establishments in Mesopotamia up to the normal
scale. Of late, indeed, these resources have been depleted
as far as is prudent, having regard to the requirements of
India and other theatres of war. We cannot, however,
avoid the finding that a serious responsibility attaches to
the military authorities in India for despatching rein
forcements to Mesopotamia insufficiently equipped with
medical establishments. We also think that, during the
early part of the war, the authorities in India were not as
prompt as they might have been in complying with
necessary demands, and that some of the expedients
suggested for meeting deficiencies were unsound. We
consider that if the medical staff available in India was
not adequate to meet the demands of the expedition,
assistance from sources outside India might have been
sought earlier. The demands of the force, particularly
in the way of hospital staff, were frequently put before
the authorities in India from an early period in 1915.
In April of that year, when the British and Indian general
hospitals were expanded to 500 and 1,000 beds respectively,
additional Royal Army Medical Corps and Indian Medical
Service officers and assistant surgeons and sub-assistant
surgeons were more than once asked for, without any
result. It was not until the end of June, when the
General Officer Commanding represented that there would
be a breakdown if conditions were not improved, that
additional officers were despatched, together with an
Indian stationary hospital maintained by private gener
osity and one section of a British general hospital. Even
then, however, the demands of the Deputy Director,
Medical Services, Mesopotamia, were not completely met,
and in reply to a request for sub-assistant surgeons, after
a great deal of haggling as to what was the correct estab
lishment for the force, the Director of Medical Services,
India, came to the conclusion that there was an excess of
assistant surgeons and suggested that, in estimating his
needs in the matter of sub-assistant surgeons, the Deputy
Director of Medical Services should reckon one assistant
surgeon as equal to two sub-assistant surgeons. This
suggestion, which was not accepted by the local authorities,
is on a par with one previously made that in order to make
good deficiencies in hospital personnel, the staffs of the

About this item

Content

A signed proof, folios 1-100, plus additional material, folios 101-124. The cover bears the signature of Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under-Secretary of State. The report has been annotated in blue pencil at various points.

Contents:

  • 'Part I. Preface.
  • 'Part II. Origin of Mesopotamia [Iraq] Expedition.'
  • 'Part III. Advance from Basra to Kurna.'
  • 'Part IV. The Advance to Amara [Al-'Amārah] and Kut [Al-Kūt].'
  • 'Part V. Correspondence and Telegrams as to Advance on Baghdad.'
  • 'Part VI. The Advance from Kut to Ctesiphon.'
  • 'Part VII. Operations for Relief of Kut.'
  • 'Part VIII. Armament, Equipment, Reinforcements, &c.'
  • 'Part IX. Transport.'
  • 'Part X. Medical Breakdown.'
  • 'Part XI. Causes Contributing to the Errors of Judgement and Shortcomings of Responsible Authorities.'
  • 'Part XII. Findings and Conclusions. Recommendations.'
  • 'Separate Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP.'
  • 'Appendix I. Vincent-Bingley Report.'
  • 'Appendix II. Memorandum by Sir Beauchamp Duff.'
  • 'Appendix III. Colonel Hehir's Account of the Siege of Kut-el-Amara.'

Additional material:

  • Folio 101. Manuscript note [by Arthur Hirtzel] on net military expenditure.
  • Folios 102-109. Copy of the East India (Army Administration), Further Papers regarding the Administration of the Army in India , 1906.
  • Folios 110-115. Manuscript notes, titled 'Suggested redraft & amplification of second half of parag 1' [unknown hand].
  • Folio 116. A clipping from the Daily Telegraph , Wednesday 4 July 1917, featuring an article titled 'Mesopotamia. Ex-Viceroy's Statement. The Medical Breakdown.'
  • Folios 117-124. An expanded typescript version of Hirtzel's manuscript notes (folio 101).
Extent and format
1 volume (122 folios)
Arrangement

A table of contents can be found at folio 4v.

An index can be found at folios 93-97.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence commences at the front cover with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 124; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is present in parallel between ff 110-115; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled. Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence. The volume comprises a stitched pamphlet, and other stitched and loose-leaf material.

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English in Latin script
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'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎73r] (145/248), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, IOR/L/PS/20/257, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100036338403.0x000092> [accessed 29 March 2024]

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