'Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a Special Report by Commander J Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. London: HMSO, 1917.' [‎75r] (149/248)

difficult to bring the wounded down, but it is equally
difficult to get medical personnel and equipment up
the river.” Sir Percy Lake, writing on the same subject
about May 12th, soon after the failure to relieve Kut,
stated that “ as the Commission is aware, the whole
situation was dominated by the question of river trans
port. The amount available was totally inadequate for
the ordinary requirements of the force. ... As the
result of this shortage of river craft it was impossible
to allot any vessel wholly for hospital piirposes or for
the transport of the wounded. It was only by utilising
every vessel on the river that it was possible to supply
the troops at the front with food and ammunition. Even
then I could not send up to them more than a portion
of their land transport or all their guns, or even all their
drafts of men to replace casualties.” He concludes his
remarks by saying, “ I should like to record my opinion
that such defects as have been brought to notice—and
there were many—were due primarily to the inadequacy
of the river transport which prejudicially affected many
other services besides those dealing with the care of
sick and wounded.” In the circumstances so clearly
explained by two General Officers who in succession
have commanded the expeditionary force, we are of
opinion that, prejudicial as the shortage of suitable
river transport was to the proper working of the medical
services, the latter could not, either at the time of General
Townshend’s advance from Kut-el-Amara or before
General Aylmer’s advance to the relief of that place,
have been allotted steamers for their exclusive use. The
paramount necessity of moving the troops and keeping
them fed and supplied with munitions overrode all other
demands, and necessitated the employment for general
purposes of all the river craft available.
87. We consider that with better organisation and
control Of river craft on the lines of communication
and at the base, greater use could have been made of
the shipping available. Numerous instances have been
brought to our notice of the miscarriage and overcarriage
of stores, of delays to steamers through lack of arrange
ments for discharging cargo, and of other delays caused
by bad staff work, such as the loading of reserve ammu
nition on the top of the tents, equipment and stores
of field ambulances required for immediate use. Many
of these mistakes were due to the inexperience of the
staff at the base, including the marine transport officers,
who were suddenly faced with all the difficulties incidental
to the administration of a river flotilla and the control
of a crowded port like Basra, which was then destitute
of jetties, wharves, storage space and other facilities,
and unable to produce even the labour required to unload
the store ships which arrived in the Shatt-el-Arab almost
daily. These defects are now being made good, and with
the classification of river craft and the better system
of traffic control recently introduced the working power
of the river steamers has appreciably increased.
88. Ambulance transport .—The next matter to which
we desire to draw the attention of Government is the
failure, throughout the campaign, to provide land ambu
lance transport for the wounded. We consider this
matter to be one of great moment, as it is proved that
the defect has been the cause of intense suffering and
must have prejudiced the chances of recovery in certain
cases. The original organisation orders of Indian Expe
ditionary Force “ D ” did not include any wheeled
transport for the sick and wounded. According to
“War Establishments, India,” each field ambulance
should have been accompanied by eight ambulance
tongas, in lieu of which the original orders for this force
allotted an additional number of riding mules. The
omission to send wheeled transport was probably due
to the fact that operations for some time were likely
to be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the
Shatt-el-Arab. The history of the campaign shows,
however, that very shortly after the capture of Basra
the operations extended to a considerable distance from
any river, and no satisfactory reason has been assigned
for the failure to provide the ordinary form of land
ambulance transport for these operations. It is in evi
dence that on many occasions during the campaign
wheeled ambulances could have been employed. In
fact, a few motors were used in the Ahwaz operations
in April and May, 1915, and again at Ctesiphon in
November, and ambulance wagons of the English pattern
were employed with conspicuous success to our own
knowledge in the operations up the Tigris in the beginning
of April, 1916. But throughout the campaign the usual
form of ambulance transport has been the army transport
cart—that is, a small springless cart made of vo-xi and
iron, drawn by mules or ponies, and ordinarily enquoyed
for the carriage of supplies. When the evidence of the
suffering caused by this means of conveyance, particu
larly in cases of fracture and severe injury, is considered,
it is difficult to avoid criticising the action of those
responsible for this deficiency in severe language. It
must be remembered that on occasions the wounded
were brought in for distances of 12 and 15 miles in these
carts. We have been told that at times patients suffered
so much on these journeys that some fainted on the way,
and others arrived at field ambulances covered with
bruises. We have also been informed that in abdominal
cases the jolting in such a cart would be likely to cause
death, and that in the case of fractures of the femur
it would endanger the chances of complete recovery.
For these reasons we consider that the use of these carts
for conveying sick and wounded, except as a means of
supplementing proper ambulance transport, is to be
condemned. Nor had this serious deficiency been
remedied when we left Mesopotamia, for on April 9th,
when there were nearly four divisions operating on the
Tigris front, only nine ambulance wagons and four motor
ambulances were available for the removal of the wounded
from the battlefield. A few more motors, which were at
that time at the base, have since been sent to the front;
but in May, 1916, the majority of the wounded were still
being conveyed from the battlefield to field ambulances
in transport carts. It is true that, in certain conditions
and in particular parts of the country, motor vehicles
and ambulance wagons cannot be used ; but on many
occasions they can be employed, and tracks on which
they can travel can often be improvised without difficulty.
For such occasions the supply of suitable ambulance
transport is, in our opinion, essential. We are aware
that in many cases the removal of all the wounded after
a battle in which the casualties are numerous cannot be
effected entirely in ambulance motors or wagons ; but
we think that a sufficiency of these conveyances should
be supplied for the evacuation of more serious cases.
89. An examination of the correspondence placed bef< re
us indicates that the necessity of providing proper laud
transport for the wounded was not apparently realised
by the military authorities, either in Mesopotamia or
in India, in the early part of the campaign ; and even up
to the present the force is, we believe, entirely dependent
on private generosity for the supply of motor ambulances.
In February, 1915, the General Officer Commanding,
Indian Expeditionary Force “ D,” was asked by the
authorities in India if he would like to have a motor
ambulance, and the offer being accepted the ambulance
was sent to Basra early in March of that year. No
further action was taken until April 20th, when another
motor ambulance was offered to the force, an offer which
was rejected by Sir John Nixon ; and it was not until
October 20th that any demand was made by the medical
or military authorities in Mesopotamia for a further
supply of such vehicles. Four were then asked for,
and three were sent. These three were supplemented
by six more sent in December and January, but there
is reason to believe that none of them were provided
by the Government. We are informed, however, that
50 “ Star ” motor ambulances, which were offered by the
Secretary of State in November, 1915, are now on their
way to Mesopotamia and will shortly arrive there.
90. Similarly, in the case of ambulance tongas, we find
that the first demand for this necessary item of equip
ment was made in November, 1915, when Surgeon-General
Hathaway indented for 50, a demand which he supple
mented in February, 1916, by a request for 250 more.
Up to recently, however, the ambulance transport in
Mesopotamia was composed of the ambulance motors
above mentioned, a small number of ambulance wagons,
and 50 ambulance tongas, very few' of w hich were available
at the front. Although, therefore, we think that the
authorities in India are responsible for the failure to
foresee the need of this transport, w'e consider that the
inertia of the medical authorities in Mesopotamia in
this matter is open to even more severe criticism. In
dealing w r ith this subject we must, however, admit that
the lack of ambulance vehicles at the front was in great
measure due to the shortage of river transport and to