Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎21r] (42/540)

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intended for the Palestine insurgents, came to hand at about this time, and it
appeared possible, all things considered, that Ibn Saud had after all found it
prudent to give some such help to the Arabs in Palestine. The Minister set out,
in a lengthy despatch, the series of events which might, with some reason, have
S* caused the King to support our enemies. Nevertheless, when His Majesty’s
Minister brought these reports of gun-running through his territory to the King’s
notice, saying that out of friendship for him His Majesty’s Government felt
compelled to pass them on in case the “ persons of ulterior motives ” (to whom
the King had elsewhere alluded) were seeking to discredit him, he denied the
accusations most vehemently and gave assurances that he was not interfering.
A fortnight later he followed this up by a very long note, which can be
summarised as follows. He drew a parallel between the present allegations and
those made against the British at the time of the Dawish and the Rifada revolts.
In spite of appeals he had refused to help the insurgents with money or
arms, not because he did not hate our Palestine policy, but because he
considered armed resistance futile. He intended to adhere to his policy
of friendship with Great Britain. The Palestine question had caused violent
agitation among his people, who, but for him, would have taken action
wldch would have increased the gravity of the situation. It was true that one
or two suspicious characters had been in the north of his country recently, but he
had had one of them deported and some cartridges which he had bought
confiscated. He ended with the usual expressions of confidence in the British
sense of justice. In spite of the King’s vehemence, it was considered possible
that he might be actively pondering in his mind the advantages of transferring
his affections to those who might well offer a good deal more in the way
of material assistance than we can, and who are not saddled by a policy
which outrages the religious and political feelings of the Arabs. A change in the
Saudi attitude to the Italians, and even flirtations with the Germans, were not
thought impossible.
46. Early in August a note was addressed to the Saudi Arabian Government
setting forth His Majesty's Government’s attitude to the two memoranda of
January and April, in which the King had explained his own views on Palestine.
His Majesty’s Government still considered partition offered the best chance of a
solution, and were awaiting the report of the Technical Commission, on the
receipt of which fresh decisions would have to be taken and submitted to Parlia
ment and the League of Nations. As for any relaxation of the measures for
repressing terrorism, that could not be contemplated so long as the opposition in
Palestine pursued such methods. Suspension of land sales and immigration
would be contrary to the terms of the mandate. The partition proposals involved
no danger to the sacred places of Islam. The advantages of partition to the
Arabs were repeated.
47. In July the Saudi Minister in London evinced a certain interest in
unofficial proposals said to have emanated from private persons in Iraq, and
suggested that His Majesty’s Government, even though they could not support
any of these schemes, might nevertheless be glad if such private persons could
find a solution acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. It was made clear to him that
even if this were the case, there was no question of any of these proposals receiving
official support.
48. The next definite move of the pan-Arab party was the organisation of
a Parliamentary Arab Conference at Cairo. The organisers said that they had
received King Ibn Saud’s written approval of the proposal. There was no doubt
that he was subjected to great pressure from the ulema and other advisers, with
the object of inducing him to send Saudi representatives. He asked the advice
of His Majesty’s Government on this point, and on the receipt of a discouraging
reply he informed the legation that he had decided not to send anyone.
49. The European crisis of September 1938 had a repercussion on Palestine
which must be mentioned here, though the happy issue of that crisis removed tin-
necessity for the proposed action. The Colonial Office proposed, in the event of
war, to abandon for the duration of hostilities the proposal to partition Palestine,
and also to suspend Jewish immigration : His Majesty’s Government would
administer the country as far as possible in accordance with the terms of the
mandate. The legation reported that such a policy would be very acceptable to
the Arabs of Saudi Arabia, and more especially to Ibn Saud.