Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎22r] (44/540)

Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. is composed half of Zionists and half of non-Zionists, and
undoubtedly non-Zionists would be included among the Jewish repre
sentatives for the discussions in London.
(3) Immigration could not be stopped pending the negotiations^ because it
would prejudice one of the main issues. His Majesty’s Government
had in July 1937 departed from the criterion of economic abortive
capacity, and had imposed as a temporary measure an arbitrary
restriction which allowed Jewish immigration at the average rate of
about 1,000 a month. In their opinion the only wise course was to
maintain the present restriction under which Jewish immigration was
not likely to exceed 12,000 a year. As the natural increase of the
Arabs in Palestine exceeded that of the Jews by at least 15,000 a
year, immigration at that rate as a temporary measure afforded no
ground for Arab fears.
(4) His Majesty’s Government wished the discussions to begin as early as
possible. If this could be arranged and representatives of the Arabs
could be ready by the beginning of December, so much the better.
(5) The question whether or not to accept the Mufti as the head of the
Palestine Arab delegation had been fully considered. His Majesty’s
Government recognised that there was much to be said for negotiating
with a generally recognised leader who was unlikely to be repudiated
subsequently, and feeling on the subject in Iraq and Egypt must also
be taken into account. Ibn Baud, however, might well dislike the
idea of the Mufti posing as the head of the Arab delegation, and this
view would be shared by the Amir Abdullah. But His Majesty’s
Government had stronger reasons for refusing to receive the Mufti;
he was regarded as chiefly responsible for the campaign of assassina
tion and intimidation, and it would be extremely unfortunate if His
Majesty's Government could be represented as having surrendered to
that campaign. There was another point (though care would have to
be taken in using it) • if the Mufti were once recognised as the Arab
leader he would be recognised as the ruler of the country and none of
the moderate Arabs would dare to come forward. The precedents of
Egypt, Ireland and South Africa did not really apply, for in the
present case of Palestine His Majesty’s Government could not con
template entrusting to the Mufti and his associates the government of
the country after the negotiations. These arguments, however, did
not apply to all the Mufti’s sympathisers, and it had always been the
intention of His Majesty’s Government to endeavour to secure as
representatives of the Palestine Arabs individuals who held equally
strong nationalist views, but had not been directly responsible for the
campaign of assassination, &c. His Majesty’s Government were even
consulting the High Commissioner for Palestine as to the possibility
of admitting as negotiators some of the Mufti’s more immediate
associates, e.q., some of the expelled members of the old Arab Higher
Committee, provided that they came as representatives of the Palestine
Arabs and not as representing the Mufti.
(6) The question of military measures in Palestine before and during the
conference was under consideration. It might be possible to relax
some of the more repressive acts against unarmed civilians, and
thereby perhaps relieve the tension. But there was no intention to
negotiate a truce with the rebel leaders; such truces had proved only
temporary in the past. On this occasion everything possible must be
done in the military as well as the political sphere to ensure that an
organised and extensive terrorist campaign could not break out again.
His Majesty’s Government must do their utmost to restore order and
normal conditions and to re-establish the administration throughout
Palestine.
(7) (This point was for the personal information of His Majesty’s represen
tatives only.) A complete stoppage of immigration pending
negotiations would almost certainly stand no chance of acceptance by
Parliament. Moreover, it was doubtful whether the Jews would
participate in that case, in view of the inequitable and impossible
position in which they would thereby be placed.
[18903] E*