Coll 6/19 'Arabia: (Saudi Arabia) Hejaz-Nejd Annual Report.' [‎105v] (211/540)

Saudi Arabia. He recorded three vows, one of which was that, so long as he
lived, he would maintain friendship with Iraq. His declaration bore out in more
express terms a friendly reference to Iraq in an interview which His Majesty
gave to journalists after the attempt on his life at the Kaaba.
9. Less importance might attach to these Royal utterances made at glowing
moments did they not appear to correspond with a real political rapprochement
between the two countries. Very early in the year the Iraqi representative in
Jedda told Sir Andrew Ryan that the attitude of the Saudi Government had
improved so much that they must surely want something. A little later Fuad Bey
referred to the possibility of the visit of an Iraqi delegation in which Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders.
as Said might take part. As time went on it became increasingly evident that
both parties were contemplating negotiations, ostensibly to settle a limited range
of particular questions, like passports, trans-frontier trade and the like, but with
a view also to a larger, if not closely defined, political objective. Matters were
delayed by the internal troubles in Iraq in the early spring, but in April, if not
earlier, draft agreements began to be bandied about.
10. In the first days of July the Iraqi Prime Minister gave to His Majesty’s
Ambassador in Bagdad the draft of a proposed treaty of friendship, which
confirmed the surmise that the settlement of particular questions was a less
immediate object than a redefinition of the political relations between the two
countries. 1 his draft, which was one of several, need not be described in detail.
It contemplated a general political agreement which was to be supplemented by
several others regarding particular subjects and which was not to come into force
until these had been negotiated. But this phase in the negotiations was
superseded in the course of the following months. This may have been partly
due to private exchanges of views between statesmen, e.g., between Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. ,
the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Fuad Bey Hamza, who met personally
in London in July. It was probably still more due to the growth in Arab circles
generally of the conviction that Europe was moving towards wars which would
provide an opportunity for the realisation of Arab national aspirations. On the
4th November Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. spoke to His Majesty’s Ambassador in Bagdad of the
probability of his visiting the Hejaz at pilgrimage time, i.e., about the end of
February 1936. There was nothing in this to suggest more than that the earlier
plan was being pursued after a period of delay; and there was obviously no
foundation foi a lepoi t ciiculated in Egypt early in December that the two States
had already concluded a treaty not merely of friendship, but of alliance.
11. The report just mentioned was promptly denied in Bagdad but on the
23rd December Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. admitted to His Majesty’s Ambassador’in Bagdad
that proposals had been made from the Saudi side, which, if adopted, would make
the proposed treaty one of defensive alliance. The Iraqi Government had agreed
to receive Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in Bagdad to discuss the matter, and Nuri Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders.
hoped that sufficient progress would be made to enable him to conclude a treaty
(he did not himself say a treaty of alliance) when he visited the Hejaz.
12 To carry the story further would be to anticipate the report for 1936,
but in view of the importance of the matter, it may here be said that developments
early in January pointed to the possibility of a treaty on definitely pan-Arab
lines, providing for a close defensive alliance, the possibility of the accession of
other States, and a good deal of meddling by the parties in the affairs of neigh
bouring Arab countries, in which Great Britain and France have special interests.
13. There is some connexion between what precedes and a suggestion,
apparently emanating from the Iraqi Government, that Saudi Arabia might
join m the non-aggression pact which had been spoken of in the course of the
year between lurkey, Persia and Iraq, with the possible participation of
Afghanistan also. Ibn Saud’s reaction to this suggestion is not known. On the
one hand, he would probably prefer to avoid commitments to Turkey and Persia
On the other, he might agree to the suggestion rather than see Iraq drawn into
an exclusively Turco-Persian orbit.
14. Nuri Pasha’s attitude regarding the possible entry of Saudi Arabia
into the League of Nations is also of interest in the above connexions, but it falls
to be dealt with later, in paragraph 114.