File 2182/1913 Pt 9 'Arabia Policy towards Bin Saud' [‎144v] (286/406)

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The authorities at Kuwait had failed to realise this “ f
or the necessity of keeping me informed of their ac 10 “> w * , t 0 me * I
while complaints poured in to Ibn Saud and w f® du ^. P® SS “ k “
was not in a position to afford an explanation ot tlie action taken or o± t e
reasons therefor. i j •
It was clear to me, however, that some mistake had occurred and, in
view of the risk of disturbance inherent in delay, I felt that no course was
open to me but to give certain guarantees regarding the futuie on behalf of
the Kuwait authorities.
I accordingly arranged with Ibn Saud that all Najd caravans should
be accompanied by special envoys on his behalf, that his Kuwait Agent,
Abdulla al Nafisi, should be appointed his special representative m respec
of tribal parties, who were not in a position to come m to procure special
envoys, e.g., the eastern tribes such as Mutair and Subai, and, finally, that
all regular town caravans should carry passes signed by the locol Amirs
These arrangements I at once communicated to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Kuwait,
assuring Ibn Saud, at the same time, that the caravans already turned away
uould now return to bring up supplies, which would not be refused provided
the arrangements as regards passes and envoys were duly observed. At the
same time I pointed out to the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , firstly, that it was not altogether
reasonable to restrict exports into the interior from Kuwait on the basis of
pre-war trade, because, in those days, the interior used to draw supplies^ from
Mecca, Damascus and Basrah among other places, whereas, under existing
conditions and with the restriction of shipping to the Hasa ports, Kuwait
had come to be the sole source of supply to Najd and, secondly, that, in view
of the arrangements made by the Mission with Ibn Saud in consultation with
Colonel Hamilton, the responsibility of the Kuwait authorities was restricted
to the prevention of illicit and unauthorised export only, while Ibn Saud
was responsible that no goods, exported to Najd under proper authority, should
leave his territories for an enemy destination.
Suffice it here to say that the arrangements now proposed by me were
promptly accepted, and the due clearance of the Najd caravans previously
turned away created a satisfactory revulsion of feeling throughout Ibn Sand’s
territories, and an episode, which had caused so much ill feeling, served very
well to remind the people of Najd of what the British Government could and
would do in the event of their abusing the privileges extended to them.
While on this subject, I should mention that the Kuwait debacle was
universally attributed in Najd to the machinations of Shaikh Salim, who was,
at the time, undoubtedly piqued by the establishment of effective British
control of the blockade and could not have found a better weapon, wherewith
to oppose it, than to make the arrangements weigh heavily on the people of
Najd, who could be trusted not to remain silent under such provocation. The
proclamation issued by him—apparently at the request of the British
authorities—and the unsympathetic manner, in which it was enforced, lent
colour to the accusations made by the Najdis.
Be that as it may, the acceptance of my proposals restored confidence in
Najd, Ibn Saud promptly set to work to ensure the effective stoppage of smug
gling from the Qasim—one of his first acts was the summary dismissal of the
Amir of Zilfi, who was notorious for complicity in the smuggling business and
by a strange coincidence, of which Shaikh Salim was not unaware, had been
the only person privileged to export supplies from Kuwait, when the rest of
the Najd caravans were turned away—and everything bade fair at last for the
establishment of an effective blockade all round.
The only person, who was not satisfied, was Shaikh Salim, regarding whose
machinations for the reversal of the arrangements above described this is not
the place to speak. On the 28th June I was able to report that Ibn Saud was
completely satisfied that the interests of his people in the matter of the block
ade were being duly safeguarded and, at the same time, I expressed the hope
that the official blockade would be maintained as affording the onlv hope of
cutting off supplies from enemy elements. In short, everything seemed to be
in a fair way to a sufficiently satisfactory solution of the blockade problem
when, about the middle of July, I received the news that Government had
decided once more to place their trust in Shaikh Salim and to leave the prose
cution of the blockade entirely in his hands, on the condition of his accepting
the services of a British Officer to assist his own blockade staff. At the same
time it was decided that imports into Kuwait from India and elsewhere should
be regulated on the basis of the reasonable monthly requirements of Kuwait
and its dependent tribes. The Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. at Kuwait had, on July 4th,
addressed a letter to Shaikh Salim on behalf of H.M.’s Government communi
cating the sanction of the Government to these arrangements.
The news of this development of the situation was naturally extremely un
palatable to Ibn Saud, who saw Shaikh Salim once more given a free hand to
promote smuggling to the enemy and to make the blockade, such as it remained,
irksome to the people of Najd. I reported that at the very moment, when these
arrangements were being made, certain enemy caravans w^ere actually present