File 4345/1912 'Trans-Persian Railway' [‎153r] (310/330)

16
Seistnn may become a place of great strategic importance in a campaign such
as is now being considered. They desire to urge that its possession by us should j
be assured by the construction of this line simultaneously with that through
Persia, and that the advantage of its possession by Russia, if they anticipate
us, should be nullified by a decision never to extend the Nushki line to Seistan.
15. It remains to consider what will be the strategic position if these
measures are given effect to. It will he seen from Appendix A, that Russia
can develop forces of great numerical superiority to those at our disposal.
If r.dl-bead of the Trans-Persian connection is brought to Nushki, the ultimate
victory of Russia can only be a matter of time. But if the alignment is
brought through and controlled at Bandar Abbas, the position is far less un
favourable. Ror if owing to the difficulties of moving large forces far from rail
ways and the slowness with which such railways can be constructed, Russia
should attempt an advance on India along the Trans-Persian railway as a single
line of advance, she would be confornted by a fortress based upon our whole sea
power. The historical instances of the lines of Torres Vedras and of Port
Arthur show the possibilities for the defensive in such a position. If she
attempted an advance on the Herat-Helmund line combined with an advance
on the Trans-Persian alignment, Great Britain would have all the strategic
advantage of interior lines. The proposed connection from Karachi to Seistan
will enable Great Britain to occupy a strong flank position which Russia could
not ignore. If neglecting the Trans-Persian alignment, she were to advance on
the Herat and Kabul lines alone, her interest in Persia would be open to our
attack and our position in the theatres of Afghanistan would be strengthened
by the Karachi-Seistan connection.
16. The commercial aspects of the scheme are not for the General Staff to
consider, but it is permissible to point out that their proposals coincide with
the views of the Board of Trade who consider that a line to a well known Gulf
port, preferably Bandar Abbas, is a %ine qua non.
In the strategical study of the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India it is cal
culated on the assumption that all forage required for transport animals can
he obtained locally in the country and will not have to be brought from Hussia,
that the Russians can develop the following forces on the different lines of
After four months both sides have the maximum forces necessary concen
trated in the front line and are consolidating their positions, collecting supplier
and advancing rail-heads preparatory to a final advance to serious engagements.
Where these will take place north of the Hindu Kush it is difficult to predict.
It will depend on many conditions such as the season of the year, &c.
On the Southern or Kandahar Line—
3rd January 1911.
D. Haig,
Chief of the General Staff,
Appendix A.
Summary of present strategic position.
advance in the time stated in each case, from the date of Russian mobilisation
commencing.
On the Northern or Kabul line—
Two months
Foar months
... 38,000 on the Oxus.
••• 13,000 on the Ghori Plain
""I Rail-bead is ad
vancing and sup-
, * plies are being
collected.
14,000 Tash Kurghan and Kundnz , »
Seven months
10.000 Deb Dadi
50.000 Kamard Doshi Line,
6,000 at Herat.
50,000 at Koshk.
Two months