'British Interests in Persia and the Gulf' [‎83v] (4/6)

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the matter of railways and roads in Persia denied to us, and, if rumour is to
be trusted, from considering the question of occupying Kishm or a port near
Bandar Abbas. At any rate there is a stir, and it seems a co-operation m
French and Bussian movements which makes the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. decidedly
interesting. Are we then—
i. to do nothing;
ii. to agree with Russia as to our sphere of influence, as we did with
France in Siam ; or
iii. to take precautionary steps on our own account ?
i. In favour of inactivity there is the argument that the future is
unknown. We do not know where Russian pressure will emerge, whether
Germanv will become an influence in Asia .Minor, what India s vujneiablc
points will be when the Amir dies, and whether Russia will hold together.
Why commit ourselves to engagements which wo may be unable to keep r 3
The future onlv can tell whether Russia s expansion from its tenitorial base
will compel Russia at all hazards to have Koweit^or Fao, or Bandar Abbas.
It may be unwise to look too far ahead or commit ourselves to indefensible
positions. So argue one party. On the other hand it may be too late if we
delay. Russia may secretly acquire rights, while Persia, seeing us inactive,
may cease to resist or to warn us. Hitherto the theory of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
being our special interest, and the common belief that we will not allow our
selves to be ousted from Southern Persia, and Sistan in particular,‘have been
generally accepted. Every year of inaction will weaken our rights founded
on the past, and prejudice our position when the inevitable struggle comes.
As I believe that Russian contact with India will be little short of fatal to
our rule there, I venture to think that we cannot sit still.
Sphere of ii. Shall we then come to terms with Russia ? Sir Mortimer Durand traces
influence in ^ line from Sistan, vid Kerman, Ispahan, ITamadan, and Kermanshah, to
Persia. Khanikin as marking the line up to which our influence should extend ; he
notes that the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ports are at the mercy of our ships, and he
states the principle which is to govern his conduct in the future, i.e., letting
it be understood that “ aggressive action by Russia in the north of Persia
■would immediately result in decided action by us in the south. I do not
gather that he w r ould inform Russia to that effect, but he would warn Persia,
and Persia no doubt when pressed would tell Russia. Looking, however, to
the great interval which separates Indian garrisons from any part of Persia,
and to the fact that the Indian army and exchequer are unequal to lending
Persia material aid, I do not see the advantage of tracing the Khanikin to
Sistan line without an agreement with Russia, which I understand is not
to be hoped for. Even with such an agreement difficulties might arise.
We may yet find that our western Afghan line is embarrassing if Herat is
attacked. But to Yezd or Ispahan would be a much further cry. Moreover,
Persia has no core, no power of self help or resistance, and therefore does not
fulfil the needs of a buffer State. Its deserts and want of roads are better
allies than a protectorate would be.
iii. Let us, then, take our own action.
Maintenance First, I think we should rigidly maintain our policy of excluding foreign
of supremacy Powers from the Gulf ports, and, where possible, of acquiring rights ot pre
in the Gulf, occupation. If ever territorial pressure forces us to give way at any point,
we can do so on terms, whereas a present abandonment of our past policy
would leave a vacuum into which a foreign Power would rush without
Survey
mouth of
Gulf.
Exclusion of
rivals from
Sistau.
arrangement with us. i c
Secondly, let us at once have a military and naval survey made ol every
position or island at the mouth of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . If Henjam is held to
be a place suitable for a fort, let us arrange, by lease or otherwise, to take,
hold, and fortify it. If we secure the mouth of the Gulf, the late of Turkish
ports on it will be less important.
Thirdly, although it is premature to extend the railway either by the
Helmand, which we unfortunately gave to the Amir, or by the desert road,
yet let us seek military expert advice as to the value of a railway from Quetta
by Sistan to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . If we are advised that such a railway would
not be strategically valuable, at any rate let us keep control over Mekran