'Despatch from Sir M. Durand respecting appointment of Additional Consular Officers in Persia' [‎102r] (7/18)

I should add that in the case of non-Indian Consulates I have made no allowance
for travelling charges, as these are quite uncertain. We might perhaps add about
1,500/. a-year for this and other minor charges, which I need not mention.
Besides the Diplomatic, Political, and Consular establishments, it is to be
observed that we maintain in Persia and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. a considerable Telegraph
Department, with a numerous staff of English clerks. This department has been,
and to some extent still is, a valuable organization for political and intelligence
purposes. The telegraph clerks can supply much useful information at times, and in
out-of-the-way places they are often called upon to act in somewhat responsible
situations.
The sketch map appended to this despatch shows the lines of telegraph through
Persia and the Gulf. Of these the lines extending from Tehran to Bushire, and the
line along the Gulf coasts to Fao, Jask, Charbar, and the Kelat, are maintained by
our telegraph staff, and are thoroughly efficient. The Persian line from Tehran to
fleshed is inspected by our telegraph staff, and the Government of India give a Grant-
in-aid of 20,000 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. a year towards the cost of maintenance. We have an English
clerk at Meshed. This line works well. The line from Tehran to Julfa in the north
west is in the hands of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, which has its head
quarters in London, hut it is of no great use to us for political purposes, as it is
closely watched by the Russians. This line is efficient. The rest of the lines shown
on the map are maintained and worked by the Persian Government, and are very
inefficient indeed.
We can now go on to review as a whole the state of affairs in Persia in 1899, and
to consider what steps we can take to improve our position.
The internal condition of the country, which was bad enough in 1895, is now in
some respects decidedly worse. The Shah, though a more amiable man than his
father, is weak, and easily misled; the Prime Minister has no power, and cannot
control his colleagues or the Provincial authorities; the finances are in complete
disorder, and the revenues are coming in very slowly ; the troops are unpaid, and
inclined to be mutinous; food is dear all over the country, and the people are
discontented. Meanwhile the Russians have been actively pushing their trade and
political influence in the north of Persia, and with some success. They have even
succeeded in establishing posts along the Afghan border, and in making themselves
felt in Seistan and Ispahan. On the other hand it is as true now as in 1895 that the
internal condition of Persia is not hopeless. She has practically no debt, and her
resources are great. And though the influence of Russia is perhaps predominant in
Tehran, yet England has still a strong position throughout the country. The quiet
succession of the Shah was regarded as being, and was in fact, a great success for us;
and the Shah’s nomination of his eldest son as heir apparent, though the Russians were
known to favour a younger son, also tended to increase our reputation. In various
respects, I Lis Majesty has shown goodwill towards us, and a decided disinclination to
put himself under Russian control. In the south of Persia, that is up to a line drawn
from Khanikin on the Turkish frontier, through Kermanshah, Hamadan, Ispahan,
Aezd, and Kerman to Seistan, our trade and our political influence are paramount, and
indeed, so far as Russia is concerned, almost exclusive. Russia has only just begun to
touch the fringe of the zone at Seistan and Ispahan. Neither her Consular establish
ments nor her trade extend beyond these points In the north zone on the other hand,
although the local influence of the Russians is strong, we have our Consular establish
ments right up to the Russian border; and our trade, though it is suffering from
Russian competition, is by no means beaten out of the field. The southern zone in
fact is very much more in our hands, politically and commercially, than the northern
zone is in Russian hands. All over Persia a large part of the telegraph system is
worked by us in one form or another, and our bank has established itself in Tabreez
and Resht and Meshed. Altogether, considering the advantages Russia has enjoyed,
we have much reason to be surprised that our position should be as good as it is.
Nevertheless, though things might be much worse than they are, it cannot be denied
that, both from a political and a commercial point of view, our position is being
threatened. We have now to consider what are the steps we should take to maintain
and improve it.
In discussing this point I shall proceed on the assumption that we cannot hope to
come to terms with Russia, and persuade her to join us in a policy of reform and
development.
I suggested in my Memorandum of 1895 that such a proposal, if made by us,
might possibly be accepted by Russia, especially if it formed part of a larger scheme