Coll 5/73 ‘Afghan Air Force: reports by British Military Attache Kabul 1 November 1947 to 31 October 1947’ [‎6r] (11/56)

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3. Policy - Training and Supply of idrcraft and Equipment.
(a) The policy regarding tre-ining of personnel oi the R.hfg.A.F. is clear. If
full advantage were taken of the pilot and technical instruction offered, this
should be sufficient, with the addition of courses of instruction in England
for^he very few whose education would make such instruction profitable. The
Air .Inistry have held vaonneies open and candidates for courses were selected
by the Commandant with the help of the R.A.F. Officers who held preliminary language
exams and tests. It is regretted that the Commandant with characteristic
suddenness decided not to send candidates at the last moment, as they were
shortsightedly to be employed in civil aviation, a new scheme in the Afghans'
'grasshopper minds'.
(b) I should still like some indication of a clear dividing line as to what
equipment the R.A.F. are prepared to supply from their stocks and for what items
application should be made direct to firms.
The j.ir Ministry's views would also be appreciated as to how their interests
lie in assisting the unimportant -“fghan ^ir Force. From the Foreign Office
point of view it is understood, that the assistance we are affording the id'ghans
is desirable as a mark of British friendship and from the point of view of
prestige. I too feel that our help is important. It is probable in time
that the Afghans will want to increase the R.A.F. detachment considerably and I
have agreed already to making the request on the .tifghans ' behalf, of which the
Mir Ministry knows, for two more Sgt. fitters. However, should further
increases be requested eventually, the desirability of tying up valuable R.n.F.
personnel in a comparatively unimportant role should be weighed against
considerations of prestige.
It is also known that the Afghans contemplate buying more aircraft,
though they speak of being interested in the purchase of camparatively large
numbers, it seems clear that they can at present only buy a few. The idr
Ministry's views would be appreciated concerning the type of aircraft the .ifghans
should be encouraged to buy, although of course they may determine this for
themselves. The Afghans are at present divided in their minds. They wish
to buy fairly modern fighters and are interested in the Fury and the Firefly.
On the other hand they have during the last two weeks shown more interest in
aircraft suitable for civil aviation. At present they are hardly sufiiciently
advanced to fly so modern a fighter as the Fury safely. The cost of the
individual plane is very high and accidents would be frequent, Their desire for
such fighters is due probably to envy of the Pakistan and Iranian Air Forces.
Purchase of a few such fighters would not constitute a threat to either of the
above countries, nor would Afghanistan intend it to be a threat. However,
Pakistan at the present moment might be expected to be somewhat touchy over
such a purchase. Further, it does not seem strategically important for us to
encourage small countries to set up comparatively modern small fighter lorces
where they would at once be mopped up at the outset of another war. vvere
Afghanistan considered a worthwhile ally in a future war, she could presumably
count on air support from Britain and America at some period in the course oi
that war.
7/hat appears to be really important is to assist the -Afghans to maintain a
small air force which v/ould be a decisive factor against tribesmen, should the
latter, as is possible, stage a large scale revolt. X have reported already
that in the event of a major tribal uprising the Afghan ^J^my might prove
unwieldy and it is doubly important that the air arm should be efficient if
small. If we can help the Afghans achieve a small effective air force in this
respect, a pressing need will have been met. Should the present regime be
over throv/n, control for a time would also be lost over the tribes on her side
of the Durand Line by Pakistan. Any such disturbances v/ould leave the frontier
of Pakistan more vulnerable to communist infiltration. Therefore the Afghans
should be encouraged to buy (provided they are willing) obsolete fighters which Q-re
in fact more suited to anti-tribal warfare. These would not be so costly but
on the other hand they should not be so obsolete as to be without adequate
balanced spares for about five or six years' flying.