Coll 5/65 ‘ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AIR ATTACHE KABUL & LOAN OF AIR PERSONNEL TO AFGHAN GOVNT’ [‎91r] (181/260)

aircraft at his disposal. Present method of travel from Karachi to Kabul and
return involves a minimum of eight days travelling, in order to spend one day
in Kabul, whereas Kabul is only 5i hours flight from Karachi (see Appendix 'B'),
Wing Commander ivicWhannell has already submitted*, a ease for provision of an
'^aircraft in order to carry out his duties in Pakistan satisfactorily.
Provided that this .aircraft is supplied, the arrangement for Wing Commander
McWhannell to supervise the R.A.F, personnel in Afghanistan is acceptable.
Should it not be possible to provide an aircraft for him, some alternative
arrangements must be made. General Asadullah ensidered there would be no
difficulty in obtaining permission for Wing Commander McWhannell to fly into
Afghanistan whenever required,
31. It was agreed that, should the Air Adviser become responsible for the
welfare of R.A.F. personnel in Afghanistan, he should receive copies of all
correspondence passing between .the Air Ministry and Afghanistan which affected
the discipline, administration and welfare of the R.A.F. personnel. In
addition, it was suggested that Squadron Leader Reid should send a monthly
report to the Air Adviser on these matters with a copy to the Air Ministry,
D.D.A.F.L. for information.
C orrespondence with th e A i r Minis try
32. It was agreed with II,M, Ambassador and Military Attache, Kabul that
Squadron Leader Reid could correspond direct with the Air Ministry, D.D.A.F.L,
on all matters affecting the administration of R.A.F, personnel in Afghanistan
and in matters relating to the provision of training assistance, such as the
provision of publications, syllabi and training equipment, for the Afghan Air
Force. He would not however correspond with the Air Ministry on matters of
policy or matters affecting the political situation, or on Air Force intelli
gence natters which would continue to be dealt with by the Military Attache as
hitherto.
\
33. The following is a summary of the impressions I received during my visit:
(a) The Afghan authorities rely>considerably on the assistance given'by
the R.A,F.. personnel in Afghanistan and wish this help to be*
continued and extended. They are willing to pay for the services
of these R.A.F. Instructors.
(b) The R.A.F. Instructors at present in Afghanistan are being usefully
employed and without their assistance the Afghan Air Force would
have difficulty in maintaining any operational value.
(c) The conditions under which these Instructors arc living and serving
are reasonable, though the pay of the N.C.O. Instructors might
justifiably be raised. In order that the interests of the R.A.F.
N.C.O.'s should be safeguarded, it is necessary that a contract
governing their terms of service should be prepared and agreed
with the Afghan authorities as soon as possible.
(d) ‘ It cannot bo expected that any great advances will be made by the
Afghan Air Force in the near future, since there is a sjtrong
clement which is extremely resistant to change. Until this non
progressive element is removed andjarrangenents made to improve
conditions of service and attract the right kind of recruit, it is
considered there is little chance of the Royal Afghan Air Force
becoming an efficient up-to-date force. It is understood however
that action is to bo taken to achieve this.
/ (e)
G. 169 630/DMJt/6/48.