'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎17r] (38/294)

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CHAPTER 3
A SHOR T HISTORY OF THE REBELL ION.
II -~ FROM THE 1 ST JULY 19 56 TO THE
EED QP THE YEAR.
1 st - 4th July
At the beginning of July it seemed for a day or two that the deter
mination of the Arabs was weakening under the strain. The tendency was
however checked immediately by the Higher Committee through intensive
propaganda and intimidation, while now it was preached from the mosques,
on orders of the Mufti of Jurusalem, that the rebellion had become a
religious war to save the Holy places of Islam from the Jews. In point
of fact the hoped-for 11 jehad 1 * never materialised, owing to a great extent
to the sensible counsels of the Amir of Trans-Jordan, but the threat of
it brought into view two possible contingencies. These were disaffec
tion in Trans-Jordan and a general strike of all Arab Government
officials and police in Palestine. Both were fortunately avoided,
though many of the Arab officials and most of the police adopted an
attitude of passive resistance so far as the rebellion was concerned.
But the possibility of these added dangers still remained, and it was
plain that either would require additions to the garrison. The end of
the Abyssinian War and the consequent easing of tension in the Mediter
ranean heralded the early relief of many of the troops then concentrated
in Egypt, and arrangements were made for a further increase of the troops
in Palestine. Meanwhile there were a few days of comparative lull in
the country, accompanied by information that ex-officers from Syria and
Trans-Jordan were busy re-organising the rebel bands. The period was
also marked by a bitter censure of the Administration by the British
Chief Justice in a High Court case arising from the Jaffa demolitions.
In remitting costs the Chief Justice went so far as to say that "The
Petitioner ". (an Arab householder in the Old City), " has done a public
service in exposing what I am bound to call the singularly disingenuo us
lack of moral courage displayed by the Administration in the wh ole
matter. " Not unnaturally this did much to hearten the opposition, and
similar cases were at once taken to law.
5th - 7th July
By now a recent re-organisation of the Intelligence service began
to take effect, and information came in regarding the location^of an
important band in the area south-west of Nablus, Plans were immediately
drawn up for a widespread drive of the neighbourhood, and this started
on the night of the 5th July. Pour battalions and the 8 th Hussars took
part as well as the Air Striking Force and one and a half companies of
R.A.P. armoured cars, and the operation lasted until the morning of the
7th. Unfortunately secrecy was lost from the start and there was a
general burying of arms and going to ground of all rebels. Practically
no opposition was offered and no maternal results were obtained, but
after-events were to prove that the moral effect had been very consider
able. The inaccessible areas covered by the drive had not been visited
by troops since the Great War and the inhabitants had seldom seen even
British Administrative officers: the fact remains that from the date
of the operation the district gave little further trouble for the rest
of the rebellion. This operation was known as "Operation X", and is
described in further detail in Chapter 15. The casualties were 7 Arabs
killed, 5 wounded and 1 captured, while a Private of the Seaforth High
landers was killed and an officer of the R.A.S.C. seriously wounded.