'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎36r] (76/294)

44816-1
49
rendered in accordance with Appendix III of Field Service Regulations,
and intelligence officers should not be bothered with then. ’iThere
special returns are required, such as lists of arms captured, vehicles
convoyed etc. , they should not be asked for separately, but should be
included in the daily narratives.
PRESS CORRESPONDENTS
Happenings in Palestine were increasing in news value just about
the time that the war in Abyssinia was losing interest, with a result
that an impressive number of war correspondents found their way there.
Had it been possible to give them the recognised facilities of corres
pondents in the field, there is no doubt that they would have proved
most valuable allies; but unfortunately it was not until very late in
the rebellion that the Administration agreed to the establishment of a
military press bureau. Before that, on orders from the nigh Commissioner,
direct communication between the Forces and the Press had been foroidden,
and the only official source of information available to correspondents
was the Government Press Office which issued a Daily Communique. The
Official Communique was naturally a rather bare statement of facts,
which was not sufficient for the Press and did not always make full use
of the opportunities available.
Since journalists obviously have to send in a continual flow of
colourful reports to their papers, if they are cut off from the best
sources of legitimate military news they will inevitably be forced to
resort to illegitimate means to obtain it; and this is what happened
in Palestine. The results were distasteful to the good correspondent,
bad for the discipline of the forces, and gave prominence to inaccurate
and sometimes unfortunate news. V/hen the ban was lilted eventually it
was found that the press correspondents, once freed of tiresome restric
tions and given an ample supply of authentic news, responded most
loyally and gave readily much valuable help.
The value of a "good press" in a rebellion is obviously very great,
and the best way to obtain it is to place journalists on the same foot
ing as war correspondents in the field and give them an ample supply of
accurate military information. To do this it will often be advisable
for interviews to be given by senior officers of the "Operations" branch
- and occasionally by Commanders - at which a full and frank explana ion
of the military situation can be given and questions answered. ^ I
not found to be sufficient to restrict correspondents to interviews with
press officers of "I” Branch.
MAPS
mhe map in general use in April 1936 was the War Office 1:250,000
Lambert Grid series, but the Palestine Government Survey Department was
on the point of completing a new 1:100,000 topographical map. ne
publication of this series was specially accelerated until new p*p® *
became available at the rate of about one a month, so that approximately
half the country had been covered by the time the rebellion ended. In
all 23,000 locally produced maps were issued to His Majesty s forces
between April and November.
The War Office map had many defects. It was by no means up to
date and was often sadly inaccurate, place names were spelt ^
differently to the spelling in common use in Palestine, and the Jewish
colonies were not shown. The scale was too small for normal tactical