'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎39r] (82/294)

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As a result of the steps which had been taken, the following
became the channels of communication available for military purposes
from May to September
(a) The chain of fixed and mobile W/T stations maintained by the
R.A.F. in conjunction with the T.J.F.F. and the police.
(b) The civil telephone system stiffened by personnel of the
Royal Corps of Signals.
(c) A small R.Corps of Signals Despatch Rider Letter Service.
In addition a courier service was run in connection with the daily
M.T. convoys.
Wireless
The W/T system was strained to the utmost; but nevertheless it
was successful throughout in maintaining a very high standard of
communication, of which it remained the only safe and reliable means.
Increases in the garrison, constant interruption of land lines, and
the extensive use of Rodex vehicles resulted in W/T traffic reaching
enormous proportions. The two main stations alone handled over
200,000 messages in six months, comprising nearly 4,000,000 groups,
but in spite of it there were never any serious delays. Apart from
the very high standard of efficiency of personnel, this was undoubtedly
due to a great extent to the RJV.F. system of control by areas in
contrast to the army method of control by the normal chain of command,
since any R.A.F. set could communicate direct with any other set in
the country. A somewhat excessive use of cipher and a tendency to
employ too many priority prefixes were sometimes the cause of delays.
This was especially true of routine aircraft movement signals which were
very numerous and were all prefixed " IMPORTANT 1 ’• Later it became
necessary to reduce these, and it is doubtful whether normal pracbices
designed for safety purposes in peace can be continued on active
service without prejudicing the efficient working of the signal
service • The normal lag between times of origin and times oi receipt
of messages inside the command during the period when tratfic was at
its peak was:-
”EMERGENCY” Messages Under 5 minutes
"IMMEDIATE” " About 20 ”
"IMPORTANT” ” " 30 ”
Unprefixed " H 80
Signal officers experienced much difficulty in keeping up the y//i
watches~required of them. This was usually due to thoughtlessness
on the part of commanders and staffs who expected too often continuous
watch” at small stations when tactical conditions did not demand it.
It was found that eight hours a day was the maximum watch an opera or
could be expected to keep up over lengthy periods* It wo , a y" e
been useful if a few battalion signallers had been trained to take a
watch on a W/T set, so that they could supplement the two wireless
operators on occasions when continuous watch was require • e ,,
of W/T sets at headquarters was most important and was not always fully
recognised by staff officers. It will sometimes be necessary to weigh
the relative advantages of good W/T communication ui an inconvenient
HQ site and poor W/T communication in a convenient but technically
unsatisfactory site.