'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎69v] (143/294)

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„ n „ -irotablishmeiit and in many oases sadly below even that level in
actual strength. Since machine guns were seldom used in the mils
except for pfcquets, most battalions organised their support companies
on a riPe basis, retaining only one machine-gun platoon - .and the
mortar platoon to cases where mortars had been issued. Two battalions.
Cheshires and South ’Tales Borderers - were specially organised for
railway protection work.
A •problem in organisation which confronted nearly all battalions
was how to create as many rifle platoons as possible out of a reduced
strength. The more riflemen who could be icund the more oi ten were
the men themselves enabled to spend "nights m bed - a difficulty
which was ever present in Palestine where innumerable gUo.rd duties uold
heavily on all units. The usual practice was to ensure a minimum
section strength of 1 N.C.O. and 6 men; allot one Lewis gun section
and two rifle sections to a platoon, and three platoons -o a company.
In addition the battalion H.Q. and band personnel were organized as
riflemen and took their turn in the field with tne rest.
•The tasks upon which infantry were employed were fai too many and
varied to be described in detail. It is sufficient to ociy tiiao tnere
v/ere never enough men to meet the countless demands lor defensive
duties and at the same time to ensure that sufficient striking forces
v/ere ready close at hand to hit hard at the enemy whenever he was
located. It was very seldom that it 7/as possible to employ a battalion
as a 7 /hole, and mostly it v/as a war oi small unis — more of ucn of
platoons than of companies. The protection of communications alone
demanded a high degree of dispersion, and this wide dispersion of
infantry 7 /as perhaps one of tne most noticeable features oi the opera*"
tions. In offensive work individual enterprise and ingenuity, a good
knack for stalking and an ability to move rapidly across country v/ere
the principal ingredients for successful infantry. Wide surrounding
tactics and efficient night movements invariably paid well in results.
The rates of advance in the hills 7/ere naturally very slow: small
parties might do three kilometres an hour by day and two by nighm, out
a company column with pack animals averaged some two kilos only by day
and half that at night. In the first stages of Operation "X" in very
difficult country platoon columns, moving up wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. beds and searching
caves and other cover en route, covered 8 to 10 kilometres in 6 to 7
hours - most of it under a hot sun. On another occasion tv/o battalions
of the Southern Brigade "driving" the very steep; hills flanicing the
Jaffa - Jerusalem railway did 11 kilos in 8 hours. Some further
examples of moves of well-seasoned infantry over familiar ground are
shown in Appendix XVI. If infantry v/ere required to leave their k.T.
and return to it the same day they could not be expected to move
further than a radius of six to eight kilos, from a road. Cross
country movement was invariably quickest when a track was followed,
hov/ever circuitous it might seem, and it was noticeable that even
Arabs found that it seldom paid to move away from a track by day and
never by night.
ARTILLERY
The artillery units in Palestine consisted of the five naval pom
pom detachments, the one 3-pr. detachment, one section of 3.7-in. Hows,
and two bauteries of 4.5-in, Hows. The pom-poms and 3-pr. , mounted on
lorries, operated singly and had no higher organization beyond the
single gun detachment. The first section of 3.7-in. Hows, was furnished
by H.k. b. "S ussex ": they v/ere equipped for man-handling only and v/ere
used lor some ten days in gun pits at Nablus as a counter-measure
against snipers behind sangars. They v/ere replaced by a 3.7-ih. dragon*^
drawn section of R.H.A. in the middle of August. The tv/o field batteries;
both with dragon-drawn 4.5-in. Hov/s. arrived late in the day and only
one v/as ever used in action against the rebels.