'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎76r] (156/294)

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The XX call was taken up by the R.A.F. signals organization and
transferred to the appropriate air base, where aircraft were kept stand
ing by at very short notice throughout the hours of daylight. A highly
organized system at the air bases enabled aircraft to take off for
the scene of the action immediately the XX call was received, and it was
normal for aircraft to be in the air v/ithin five minutes of the despatch
of the call. Since it was seldom more than 30 to 40 miles from the air
base to the scene of action, a detachment commander who sent out an XX
call could usually expect to see aircraft overhead within half an hour.
On arrival the aircraft went into action immediately, troops assisting
by indicating targets where necessary and controlling co-operative action
by means of ground strips and light signals. GO calls v/ere accepted by
the R.A.F. signals in the same way and transferred to the appropriate
military area or formation headquarters.
In addition to the Air Striking Force organization military area
commanders had usually a call as well on allotted flights for recon
naissance work and routine army co-operation duties, on which bombers
had to be employed for most of the time owing to the lack of army co
operation aircraft.
Intercommunication between troops and aircraft
In order to make the fullest possible use of the Air Striking
Force it was essential that troops operating in the field should at all
times be able to communicate quickly with the appropriate air base.
Normally this was of course ensured by allotting Rodex vehicles, but it
was not always remembered that an XX call could also be sent - though
much more slowly - by means of the ordinary army signal channels. More
often however the problem was to keep touch with the nodex, whicn was
necessarily tied to the roads, when columns were operating in the hills.
If pack wireless was available, this was best arranged by' stationing one
terminal of the army wireless link with the Rodex under adequate guard
at the nearest point of the road to the scene of operations. ^ If there
was no pack wireless then a series of visual stations had to oe establis ed.
Once aircraft were overhead communication from the ground was pro
vided by means of the Middle East Ground Signal Code and by Verey lights.
C ommun i c a t i on by lamp signals and mess age-picking-up was seldom pracoic
able owing to the mountainous nature of the ground. The M.E. ground
Code worked very well on the whole, though it needed a good d^a o
practice, and reinforcements not trained in its use iound it >/ery s ow
at first. In this type of operations it was essential that eve ^7
independent detachment, however small, should be in possession oe
set of strips and code book on all occasions, aud be oroug y -
and frequently practiced in their use. Though not designe or ne
transmission of detailed messages, the code proved mos^ e i °
hands of troops accustomed to its use. wiere were nou
deficiencies in the list, but spare signals were included ^ch could
always be made use of for messages of local significance. » ^
signals were practically confined to indicating the oca ion o
enemy by red lights and that of the forward troops by white lights.
As in other forms of warfare the indication of the t ^® d#
leading troops was not an easy matter, and severa ex^e easily
White Verey lights were not easy to see and smoke candles were easily
mistaken for the familiar native bonfire. Flares, so som e-
France, would have been better; while the waving oi J“ S< T e air _
times quite effective. Two important aids were ne g
-craft crews of the type of headdress being worn by the trooped tne
display of the proper ground ^ each platoon and company head
quarters. Much valuable time ^ °ften £3^ ^ this ^ e speci-
out the moment aircraft ^ appeared in th J were converging on
ally important on occasions when two or more
the enemy from different directions.