'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎83v] (171/294)

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distributed among the shopping streets of Jerusalem and Jaffa as an "
intimidation" measure. At this time 5Cffo of the garrison were tied to
defensive duties in spite of considerable reinforcement, and one Brig h
had no less than 377 men employed upon duties in relief of police.
In discussing the matter with the Inspector-General of Police on the
8th July, the senior army officer at Force Headquarters put in the follow
ing terms his view of the situation: "Military operations which arp
essential are definitely being interfered vath owing tothe cont inual
large demands made by the civil administration or p olice for p
It is vitally necessary at this juncture for villagers in remote anrH^i
accessible parts to see the troops and to see them frequen tly. —
cannot be done if troops are being confined to toymis on static polios ~
duties". No appreciable change of policy, however, followed and this
drain on military resources continued throughout; until even in late
September when the 1st Division was moving across Palestine to take up
position it v/itnessed the melancholy spectacle of pairs of soldiers each
with one policeman, standing at street corners or pacing outside shou
windows on "anti-intimidation" patrols. " ^
The effect of such employment on the morale of the troops was
scarcely less important than its effect upon the military plan. If the
police liked doing soldiers' work, the soldiers cordially detested the
policemen's; and the anti-intimidation patrol, which in Practice in
evitably placed soldiers under the orders of a policeman in all except
m name, was^the most unpopular of all. In the early stages the troops
accepted their new tasks cheerfully enough, knowing that the police had
ad a^bad time and needed rest, but after weeks had passed and this reason
ceasea to be valid opinions rather changed. Soon all units were findincr
io ex reme y difficult, to give their men a reasonable number of nights in
bed, most of them were living in tents with much discomfort from sand and
ion was short and rare and organized games unknown. Under
vn th ^ ^ as g all ing for patrols etc. to pass a police barracks
Lver in P ro ^ ess > or for a soldier who might be watching
over vegetable sellers in a Jerusalem street to see British Police in a
To a ® w i s g'un dashing out to answer an S.O.S. in the country.
but thJL ace e ^k e r action probably seemed natural and harmless enough
fortaMe ^ ^ ^ in time th ^ S ave the soldier the uncom-
oolice and -p ^. Y/as ^ ein g landed with the donkey work of the
P and deprived of his fair share in the field.
.Defensive d uties of a military n ature.
latterly,o df i ^ = laEslf ied as Guards, Picquets and Escorts. The
ene^ in ? h e field 7 provided an opportunity of striking at the
important part in tv, • f° 0ps em pi°y e d upon them therefore played an
duties had to be entered oJthe^eVt M ^ ° ther hand troops on guard
since they seldnn • n ,, dedl " S1 ^ e the military balance sheet,
duties ^ori^tel^InoS^I l^ negatiVe — lts
one time accounted for the totV - pro P ori;ion of troops, and at an
less than three compari e7J 1 f n0bLl:1 - 2ation °f the equivalent of not
this proportion was" vreater tht'th 1 ' 7 ' • There Se8niS little doubt that
° " the circumstances should have demanded.
to consider Aethetf ^ctwa^aftaallv 1 ' es00rt f t was usually necessary
whether it could better be provided bv t r '-' c i U:Lrea at all and, if so,
questionable whether a milit^r ' d troops or ^ police. It is
to protect something which is nofvit’l°t ® uard » is Justified
as, say a bank - bu 4 - v/hirvin a ltcl ^ the needs of the moment - such
life of the country". ' For 1-ntT- edly hcilps '' in maintaining the normal
military and air forces was expended deal ° f ener ^ of both ,
from the Dead Sea to Jerus^lJ?^ • on seeing that potash v/as brought
the ports of Palestine to outsider]!! order to be exported through
--s uinations. It is open to question