'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎88r] (180/294)

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ChAPTER 14,
PROTECTION OF COMMINinATIONS
G^mAL
Since the sahote^ar directed the greater part of his labours towards
the destruction of communications, it was inevitable that the majority
ox troops on defensive cLuciss should have been occupied in their pro**
section. Generality tney were of two types, the first being communica
tions necessary for military purposes. These consisted of:-
(a) Rail communication from Egypt to Lydda, and thence to Haifa
and Jerusalem.
(b) The main roads and the motor traffic on them, especially the
three main arteries: the North-South road from Nazareth to
Jerusalem through Nablus, and the two East-West roads from
Tiberias to Nazareth and Haifa and from Allenby Bridge to
Jerusalem and Jaffa.
(c) The civil telephone (and telegraph) system - expecially the
overhead lines, following the main roads, linking Jerusalem with
Haifa, Nablus, and the Sarafand-Jaffa-Lydda-Ramleh area.
(d) The pipe-line which brought the Jerusalem water supply from
the neighbourhood of Petah Tiqya.
All of these were of course equally important to the needs of the
civil population; but the maintenance of communications in the second
category was not strictly essential to either, and in ordering their
protection the Government was influenced by wider considerations
beyond the immediate needs of Palestine. In this category wtre:-
(e) The feeder line of the Hedjaz Railway running from Haifa to A1
Hamme, via Beisan and Samakh. Beyond A1 Hamme the line entered
French Territory and continued to Damascus, so that its mainten
ance had to be ensured in French interests. Furthermore the
strange situation existed in that the kilometres of line
betv/een Samakh and A1 Hamme was operated by the French although
lying within the borders of Palestine.
(f) The oil pipe-line of the Iraq Petroleum Company, running
from Jisr Al Mejami to Haifa.
Of these two the importance of securing French interests can
readily be understood and any military efforts expended on their
behalf were adequately repaid by the friendly co-operation of French
troops on their own side of the frontier. Besides this railway,
although not essential, was undoubtedly of value for both military and
civilian purposes and under the circumstances its protection oy force
of arms was amply justified. The sane can scarcely be said of the
pipe-line, which was of no local military importance ana of no _
interest to any but a very small section of the population. i-s
destruction would have hit hardest Arab interests, and it may safely oe
surmised that Iraqi influence with the rebel leaders alone would have
been sufficient to guard against anything more than minor sabotage of
nuisance value only. It is difficult therefore to avoid regaiding
military effort expended on its protection as wasteful diversion irom
more productive duties.