'Military Lessons of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936' [‎91r] (186/294)

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. Kln “ 18 ° f . roa ^ smarted a good deal later, and was rather more
sen ,i, : ; sxnoe it led directly to casualties, whereas other fomns of
roaa S'.botage caused little more than delays and ertra work for the
troops. The first attempt at this sort of terrorism was the institu
tion OI a si \[n.e lOeu <uook of stones inside which was hidden a Mills bomb
The pm was wi.harawn and the lever held down by jarmdng the bomb between
stones, oO th<,.L, the lever vrould be freed and the bomb set off by anvone
removing the stones. This type of trap had little value once the troops
nac. learnt to be on me look out for it, owing to the fact that the
delay action of the bomb gave the would-be victim time to throw it awav
and take cover when it had been detected. They were practically dis-
carded later once it had become the usual practice to utilise labour
from nearby villages to clear road blocks. There is also a suspicion
that accidents m installing bombs may have caused more casualties than
those in removing them.
The road-mine proper was a good deal more formidable. It was
buried^ just below the surface and set off by contact or by means of a
1 1 ip-wixe v/hich was fastened to a wire loop holding down the striker.
The body of the mine was either an old live shell or a length of 27-"
pipe filled with gelignite and rusty nails. Fastened to the mine'by
means 01 a metal strap was a device similar to a mouse trap with the
strikox held back by a loop of wire. In the body of the mine a hole
WG.S drilled to ^ take a detonator inserted in the explosive filling, and
a nail was positioned over the detonator. As soon as the striker loop
was released the striker would spring over and hit the nail, which set
Oc.f the detonator and exploded tne charge. Though the manufacture of
these internal machines must have been a most hazardous pursuit, it
has to oe admitted that they seldom failed in operation and the few
failures were mostly due to "dud” shells. The surprising thing is how
very few casualties tney did cause: the 8th Hussars, who operated over
sand tracks where mines were almost impossible to detect at night, had
no less than twelve cars blown up without serious casualties resulting.
Fortunately on tarmac roads it was almost impossible to conceal mines
and drivers soon learnt to look out for them, but they had a certain
delaying effect at night by slowing up traffic and making it necessary
to burn headlights. A better control of explosives throughout the
country might have reduced the number of mines, while some protective
device underneath motor vehicles would have minimised their effect.
Had it been permitted, the best deterrent would probably have been the
carrying of hostages.
All these forms of sabotage were generally committed during the
night, and the main military problem therefore became one of keeping
the road under observation during the hours of darkness. At first this
was done by means of infantry patrols in lorries or by armoured cars;
out the enemy soon spotted them as being suitable targets and arranged
almost nightly ambushes, usually combined with a road block, from which
he could open heavy fire at short range and rely upon darkness to ensure
an easy retreat. These tactics ’soon led to the use of armoured vehicles
only for patrols, but their small arms fire had little effect upon the
rebels behind we 11 -p rep are d cover and something more nvasr^requi red.
For a time the addition of rifle grenades to the equipment of the armoured
cars sufficed, but later it was necessary to include gun lorries and
searchlights in the patrols. But these proved to be an even more tempt
ing bait to the- rebels, and led to what became almost nightly fire fights
between strong rebel ambushes and elaborate road patrols. In most
cases the ambushers depended upon their initial volleys to do the chief
uainage and seldom waited after the first few rounds of gunfire, so that
there were few casualties on either side as a result of these numerous
night actions. There is little doubt that this development of the
straightforward road patrol did result in the expenditure of too much
force on the duties of road protection, though it certainly secured a
fair degree of immunity for the road and the telephone lines. As a means
01 striking at the enemy it failed chiefly because it did not introduce
-he element of surprise, which lay mostly with the enemy. In fact it