Coll 5/11 ‘Air Route to India: Arab Coast Route – Emergency Landing Ground at Qatar’ [‎170v] (340/345)

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IV.—Summary.
. ^ ie ex tension to the coast of the authority of Ibn Sand and the-
influence of the Wahabi movement, the rcassertion of Persian authority in
the Persian (udf, and the question of an Imperial air route along the north
Arabian coast, have combined to invest the Trucial Sheikhdoms with a new
importance. If the air route is to materialise ; if 11 is Majesty ’s Governments^
in the light of the report of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Sub-Committee, remain of the™
opinion that the maintenance of British influence in the Gulf is a matter of
paramount importance, alike from the Imperial and from the Indian
standpoint; and if they are no longer.to enjoy on the south Persian coast the
privileged position which they have enjoyed in the past; then the consoli
dation of their influence on the north Arabian shore is a matter of very
much greater and more definite importance than at am r earlier period.
25. If, however, that influence is to be maintained and consolidated, the
lact that the Trucial Chiefs are guaranteed (even though to an extent
difficult precisely to define) the protection of His Majesty’s Government,
and are forbidden to communicate with outside Powers or to receive their
representatives, necessitates a clear understanding as to the extent to which
His Majesty s Government are in a position and are prepared to defend their
interests, whether against Persia or against Ibn Sand.
26. Ot the two, Persia presents the less serious problem. Even should
she seriously put forward claims to suzerainty on the Arab coast, she is not,,
as matteis stand, in a position to enforce them, nor could His Majesty’s
Government acquiesce in her pursuit of an active policy of aggression on
the north Arabian coast, any more than in those Trucial islands in the Gulf
which they have recognised as vested in the Trucial Chiefs, without resiling
from the policy which they have hitherto consistently pursued. Moreover,
the 1 racial Sheikhs and their tribesmen are bound to Persia by ties neither
of race nor of religion, while the north Arabian shore (as distinct from the
1 racial islands, certain of which appear to contain valuable mineral deposits)
offers no commercial or pecuniary reward to justify an active Persian
interest.
* Letter from P.A.,
Bahrein, to Pol. Rea.,
April 1* 1927
P.3334/27.
2< . Ibn Saud, and the Wahabi movement of which he is the representative,,
constitute a much more serious problem. In the first place, in the words
of Sheikh Hamad of Bahrein, Ibn Saud is “the one big Arab ruler, and it is
natural for all the smaller Arab Sheikhs ... to look up to him and try to
please him. Historically, he has claims ol standing to a predominant
influence on the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , and geographically his extension to that
coast would, but for the presence of His Majesty’s Government, be a natural
process. The special tenets of the Wahabi creed are familiar to the Trucial
tiibesmen ; certain at any rate of the r J racial Sheikhdoms are traditionally
strongly Wahabi in outlook; while racially the Trucial Arabs and the
W ahabis of the interior descend from common stocks.
28. It is clear that in these circumstances the problem of preventing the
absorption of the Trucial Sheikhdoms by Ibn Saud or their gradual
penetration by Wahabi influence is one of great difficulty, the more so in
view of the known Wahabi sentiments of certain of the Trucial Sheikhs.
VT possible military aggression by the King of the llejaz and of
Nejd may be discounted so long as his general relations with His Majesty’s
Government remain friendly, and the Government of India have already
expressed the view (see para. 15 above) that they are justified, in the light
of past history, in relying for security against the danger of Wahabi
encroachments on the treaty engagements into which Ibn Saud has entered
with llis Majesty s Government. But w 7 hde this is true of an aggressive
military policy, it appears almost impossible for His Majesty’s Government
effectively to prevent the penetration by peaceful means of the Trucial
States by Ibn Saud and his adherents-a process the more difficult to combat
for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph.
—.1. As matters stand, the most that it appears possible for Ills Majesty’s-
Government usefully to do is to arrange for the showing of the flag by His
Majesty’s ships along the Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. , possibly to a greater extent even
than at present; to construe in a strict sense the undertakings given by
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