Coll 6/66 'Saudi-Arabia: Saudi-Transjordan Frontier' [‎82v] (164/427)

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same mountain and there was no practicable gap between them. On the other
hand, the British authorities in Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , believing that the Hadda Agree
ment 5 entitled them to a track round the eastern end of the Jebel Tubeik within
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan territory, had naturally made use of the existing track nearest to
the mountain. In so far as this track could be plotted at all on the 1918 map, it
appeared to go round the eastern end of the bluff known as Thaila Maizila. But
this bluff, although shown on the 1918 map as just running over the frontiers
apparently lay in a totally different position. Its exact position could not be
established without a full and detailed survey of all the other features in the
neighbourhood on both sides of the present boundary, and such a survey would
certainly have to be carried out before any satisfactory decision could be reached
as to where the true frontier really lay.
In order to approach the problem with any hope of success it was necessary
to consider the intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton; not with a
view to changing the frontier, but with a view to securing a true and correct
interpretation of the frontier which they were, in fact, trying to establish when
they signed the Hadda Agreement. They were both wide-minded and far-seeing
men, who would naturally have dealt with the problem on broad and common-
sense lines, and who were not likely to be preoccupied with trivial issues; and, in
view of the hopeless inaccuracy of the map, particularly in this area, it was only
by the criterion of the true intentions of the negotiators that proper effect could
be given to the agreement which they had reached. Bearing these considerations
in mind, Mr. Rendel thought that there could be no doubt that, just as the
projecting edges of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan were intended to fall within Saudi Arabia
(wherever they might actually lie and however different their true position might
be from that shown on the 1918 map), so the track round Thaila Maizila (which
was the nearest approach in fact to the Carruthers and Shakespeare track shown
on the 1918 map) should fall within Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
Mr. Rendel therefore suggested that the only really effective way of settling
this difficult problem would be in the first place to arrange for a full and accurate
new survey of the whole area by agreement between both parties. This survey
would have to extend over Saudi as well as over Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan territory if all the
features were to be correctly placed in their true relationship to each other. By
this means the true facts would be established. Secondly, it would be necessary
to agree as to the main intentions of King Abdul Aziz and Sir G. Clayton, with
a view to establishing as nearly as possible exactly what frontier they were trying
to lay down. When this had been done, and the facts had been established and
a general criterion agreed upon for the interpretation of doubtful points, it would
be necessary to appoint a frontier delimitation commission, whose task should
be, taking into account these intentions, to mark on the ground and on a full and
accurate map, the nearest possible approach to the line which King Abdul Aziz
and Sir G. Clayton had tried to lay down.
FUAD BEY asked Mr. Rendel whether he could be furnished with the new
data which had led His Majesty’s Government to form their present view as to the
inaccuracy of the map.
Mr. RENDEL replied that this information was still fragmentary and
inconclusive. It had shown quite definitely that the 1918 map was hopelessly
wrong. But it had not yet been possible to produce a correct map of the whole
area. It was for this purpose that a new survey, extending over both sides of the
frontier, would be required.
FUAD BEY observed that, if the intentions of King Abdul Aziz and
Sir G. Clayton were to be adopted as a criterion, the Saudi Government would
certainly have to press their claim to Hazim. Mr. Rendel had spoken of the
projecting edges of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan, and this was definitely part of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows.
Sirhan system. Moreover, King Abdul Aziz had claimed the Jebel Rashrashiya
at the head of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan, and this had formed the subject of detailed
discussion at the time of the negotiations. It had been intended that
King Abdul Aziz should have this hill, and Hazim naturally went with it.
Mr. RENDEL pointed out that it was clear from article 1 of the Hadda
Agreement that the phrase regarding the projecting edges of the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan
only applied to the part of the frontier which turned eastwards, south of parallel
31 c 25', where the frontier began to slope eastwards. This was the first time that