'Report on the Arms Traffic, 1st July 1911 to 30th June 1913 (including a note on the operations of the Makran Field Force in April and May 1911)' [‎10r] (19/44)

(c) Informers were sent into Afghanistan to ascertain intended plans,
(d) All steamers plying to the Gulf were patrolled and Pathan arms traders,
if caught, were sent to Dera Ismail Khan jail.
(e) Pilgrims to Baghdad were escorted by police officers to see that they
were bond fide, for the Pathan was always ready to try and slip past
in disguise as a pilgrim.
(/) Information was supplied to the naval and military intelligence officers,
and interpreters were provided for the naval authorities.
These measures were eminently successful, a statement borne out by the rise
in price of arms on the frontier, and by the increase of rifle thefts in India.
The following confiscations were made on ships trading in the Gulf, chiefly
through the police, patrols :—■
Arms. Ammunition.
1911- 12. .. .. 68 .. .. 11,276.
1912- 13 66 .. .. 1,430.
10. Other measures of suppression suggested but not adopted.
Mr. Gregson’s suggestion .—On June 7th 1911 Mr. Gregson suggested the fol
lowing measures in order to avoid the expense of keeping th 3 navy continuously
employed on the blockade :—
(a) Strengthening the line guard "of the Indo-European Telegraph Depart
ment by 150 men, to form a levy corps for coast guard’s work.
(b) Two outposts at Sadaich and Galag holding 50 iren each, and lines at
Jaskand Chahbar to accommodate 25 men each.
A wireless installation at Sadaich and Chahbar.
The troops at Jask and Chahbar and the Makran levies at Jiunri to
co-operate.
At sea 4 ships of 100 tons each, and maximum speed of 15 knots with
wireless and water distilling apparatus.
(/) For Biaban, where there is no telegraph line, a local arrangement with
the chiet of Kuhistak and Sirik.
(c)
(d)
(e)
The General Staff considered that four preventive boats would be insufficient
to watch the coast from Gwatar to Lingek (500 miles), and that the crews were
too small to deal with landings ; also that the efficiency of the land measures
was doubtful. Though the measures were inadequate at the time, they might help
to prevent smuggling in Makran after the main arms trade had been killed.
The Admiral considered that the cost of the small ships would be more
than Mr. Gregson thought, but he approved the land measures.
Sir P. Cox thought the measures were based on a wrong hypothesis, and sup
ported Major Webb-Ware’s suggestion of a line guard at Dehaneh Baghi; but con
sidered that if, the Telegraph line were extended to Minab, with telegraph levies
along it, and a consul were placed at Bampur with a strong escort, we could per
manently keep Makran out of mischief, and prevent Afghans reaching the coast.
Mr. Gregson’s suggestion was not adopted as there were political objections to
increasing the number of line guards, and to placing outposts at Sadaich and Galag,
while the extension of the telegraph to Minab, though within our rights, appeared to
be an expensive method of saving expenditure on the navy.
The Admiral’s suggestion .—In May 1912 the Admiral stated that the trade
had lately revived, and that though only carried on in a modified form with the
Makran coast, it was spreading in a manner very difficult to deal with in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and imports into Masqat were increasing. The Admiral proposed
that four more launches, in addition to the four ships and four launches already
employed, should be used after October 1912, that the wireless stations be
established as soon as possible; and that a warehouse be placed at Sohar as well
S5GSB