Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎24v] (48/1031)

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was signed at the end of April and an apparently satisfactory meeting took place
between the Minister of the Interior and Mulla Mustafa in the same month.
Meanwhile, His Majesty’s Ambassador made it clear to the Iraqi Government
that His Majesty’s Government did not regard the Kurds as a separate community,
but simply as Iraqi subjects. At the same time, the Iraqi Government were
advised to pursue and intensify their measures directed towards social betterment
in Kurdistan, and also to give wider publicity in the press and elsewhere to what
had been accomplished. The policy of conciliation was not popular in political
circles in Bagdad, which favoured a punitive expedition. Nor did it content
Mulla Mustafa, whose men became involved in skirmishes with the police,
situation deteriorated rapidly when Mulla Mustafa, haying appointed himself
arbiter in a tribal murder case, proceeded to Dohuk with an armed band, in
defiance of Government orders and the advice of His Majesty’s Charge d Affaires.
This action, coupled with the forcible seizure of several thousand yards of cloth
from the Serai at Mergasur and the occupation by the insurgents of Government
posts, finally decided the Cabinet to take action by calling on the Iraqi army to
proceed without delay to the north.
12. It was some time before operations commenced. Apart from the lack of
trained personnel and inadequacy of staff arrangements for a major militarv
operation, disagreement arose between General Renton, head of the British
military mission to the Iraqi army, and the Cabinet, regarding the plan of opera
tion, which the former looked upon as militarily unsound. After some discussion,
agreement was reached, with the proviso that in the event of the Ministry of
Defence ordering operations which, in General Renton’s opinion, were militarily
unsound or involved more than normal risks of war, the mission would not partici
pate in the field. Furthermore, it was made clear to the Government by His
Majesty’s Charge d’Affaires that no British or Indian troops or members of the
Royal Air Force would be sent to the disaffected areas to assist the Government in
the event of failure of the operations. Steps were taken to evacuate the Royal
Air Force Rest Camp at Ser Amadia; deputy assistant political advisers and area
liaison officers were withdrawn from the scene of operations and, on the 4th
September, approximately six weeks from the time of Mulla Mustafa’s demarche
at Dohuk, three columns of the Iraqi army, numbering in all some 14,000 men,
began to advance from Aqra, Rowanduz and Amadia. It is unnecessary to give
a detailed account of the operations. Before the main advance, referred to above,
a column was hurriedly, and without the knowledge of General Renton, ordered
to advance from Bafistian to Sidaka. and, after suffering very heavy casualties,
was only extricated from this deplorable position by the clever intervention of
the Minister of the Interior, who, taking advantage of a quarrel which had arisen
between Mulla Mustafa and one of his chief supporters, Mahmud Agha Zibari,
bribed the latter and other tribal chiefs to join the Government forces. By the
middle of October the rebels were in full retreat, thanks mainly to the Minister of
Interior’s tribal irregulars, whose help prevented the campaign from dragging
on through the winter. Although the Government and army had lost a certain
amount of prestige, official communiques spoke of the operation as a complete
success. Mulla Mustafa, defiant to the end, crossed over the frontier into the
Russian-occupied zone of Persia with 2,000 followers, of whom 500 were armed.
The Government made representations to the Persian and Russian authorities
requesting that the Barzanis be treated as fugitives from justice and their arms
be handed over to the Persian commander of the area. These representations have
: so far met with no success. It is reported that Mulla Mustafa has now enlisted
the support of the Russians; and the Iraqi Government fear that he has every
l intention of making a counter-attack in the spring.
13. In Barzan the Government are endeavouring to carry out a policy of
reconstruction and re-settlement. Compensation has been paid to owners of
destroyed houses, measures have been taken to look after refugees, and grain
has been distributed in some areas, but the building of a Government police post
has taken priority over the building of a school and dispensary, a step which,
though necessary, is not likely to influence the Kurds in favour of Iraqi goodwill.
In November the Regent visited the north, where he was joined by the Ministers
of Interior and Defence, and decorated members of his armed forces for their
part in the Barzan operations and Kurdish chiefs who had sided with the
Government.
14. But Kurdistan is still a source of grave concern. Many Kurds, while
blaming the rebel leaders for bringing misery to Kurdistan, have come to regard
Great Britain as hostile and now tend to look to Russia for help. The present
revolt in Azerbaijan is strengthening this tendency.