Coll 17/10(4) 'Internal: political situation; relations with HMG' [‎402v] (804/1031)

secured this declaration and that he had undertaken in exchange to recommend
to his own Government a number of German desiderata, the first then being
{a) The opening of direct telegraphic communication with Italy and
Germany;
(b) The subsequent resumption of diplomatic relations with Germany; and
(c) The introduction of anti-Jewish legislation “ as already agreed to by
Bulgaria.”
4. The German declaration was welcomed in the press, though less for the
value of the promises it contained than as an admission by important European
Powers of the importance of the Arabs as a factor in world politics and of the
necessity of conciliating them. The Director-General of Press and Propaganda
made frantic and undignified efforts to suppress criticism of the declaration or
any exposure of its hollow and worthless character, as if it were, in fact, the
Cabinet’s child. The Iraqi Charge d’Affaires in Rome asked for (apparently on
his own initiative, and not on instructions), and received, the authentic text of
the corresponding declaration made on the Italian wireless; it was passed on
to one or two departments for information.
5. Telegraphic communication with Germany and Italy had never been
stopped by specific order. It had ceased automatically soon after the outbreak
of hostilities with each by reason of the refusal of the normal agencies, Marconi
in Cairo, Radio-Orient in Beirut, and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. cable, to accept telegrams
addressed to those countries. Suddenly on the 21st October (on the file shown to
me by the then Minister of Communications and Works there is no sign of any
preliminaries) the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs telegraphed to
Persia asking at what rates telegrams should be accepted in Iraq for transmission
to Germany and Italy via Tehran; a reply having been received, a circular
instruction was sent to all offices intimating the rates. This operation cannot be
described as a routine resumption of telegraphic communications never officially
interrupted; it involved the opening of a new circuit not shown in the Berne list.
6. There is no doubt that, as early as the end of June or the beginning of
July (see my note on pan-Arab activity in Iraq of the 31st July, 1940, para
graphs 17 and 18), a resumption of relations with Germany had begun to be
regarded by some people as a wise measure of reinsurance. It is interesting to
note that already at that time the names of Musa Shahbandar and Ali Haidar
(both of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) were mentioned as possible emissaries,
for, six months later, the former was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in
Rashid Ali’s short-lived Blackleg Cabinet and the latter, junior official though
he is, was being freely tipped for the Ministry of Economics. In the only
conversation I had with him Musa made no secret of his views on the original
rupture with Germany (see my letter of the 3rd February, 1941, last paragraph).
7. As regards anti-Jewish legislation, it is only fair to record that even
the rumours had it that Rashid Ali and Naji Suwaidi had set their faces firmly
against any such suggestion, though, it was alleged, primarily for reasons
connected with their own financial affairs.
8. Another example of growing recklessness was the preparation early in
November, and submission to the Regent, of Royal iradas for the pardon of a
number of persons sentenced by the military courts at Mosul, including the youth
sentenced for participation in the murder of the British Consult Mosul;
Rashid Ali had already twice been dissuaded by me from doing this, but in
November I was not informed of the intention; the official initiative came from
the Ministry of Defence.
9. In this letter I am concerned only with the public manifestation of the
tendency under discussion, and not with intrigues that may have been going on
underground. It is sufficient to say that, although the Palestine theme almost
ceased to be mentioned in the press and in conversation, it was only to be expected
in the circumstances that relations between the Italian Legation." the Mufti and
anti-British elements both in the Cabinet and outside should become closer and
closer; further reference is made to this point below.
(B)
10. I had intended at this point to give two enlightening examples of
eccentric behaviour by the Cabinet, but omit them in the interest of brevity