Ext 5001/41 'PERSIA – INTERNAL (Miscellaneous despatches).' [‎105v] (210/248)

4
the disorders. The events of recent weeks have shown that the Government and
Sovereign of Persia must, in the end, do what the Allies want; but it has yet to
be seen whether we can prevent the victimisation of a Government for acting in
accordance with our wishes.
Security Questions.
10a. Of the suspects at Sultanabad, eight have been released : the re^*
remain in detention, the interrogation having established that there was goou
ground for their being detained. Very late in the day a Persian commissioner and
two senior Persian judges arrived. They have given no trouble at all, either in
wishing to sway the verdict, or in being unduly critical of the conditions of
detention. The search for Germans, and for Persian suspects whom the Persian
police professed to be unable to find, has gone on : one German living in Tehran
has been caught, and life has been made very risky for a number of other suspects.
11. In December it became essential to get rid of General Zahidi, General
Officer Commanding, Isfahan, who had sabotaged wheat collection, made civil
Government impossible, shown indifference if not hostility when Vice-Consul
Harris and Dr. Griffiths were murdered, dealt with and harboured German agents
and encouraged Nasir Qashgai and even supplied him with arms. This was at
the moment when the Qawam Government seemed to be weakest, and the Prime
Minister, who even at the best would have been afraid to touch so prominent
an officer, would certainly have been unable to arrest him then, so it was decided
that Zahidi should be taken by the British military authorities. The arrest was
entrusted to Captain Fitzroy Maclean, M.P.. who, acting fortiter as a parachutist,
but suaviter as an ex-secretary of embassy, effected it with brilliant ease. The
Prime Minister and the Shah were both informed of Zahidi’s arrest as soon as
possible and of the reasons for it. Both asked whether we could not have
mentioned it beforehand, and received the explanation that it was desired not
to embarrass them. The Shah said that he would have such people punished
severely, even by death; but neither expressed the least surprise at the catalogue
given above of the offences of which Zahidi is believed by us to be guilty. It is
alleged in some quarters that the arrest of Zahidi by the British authorities has
administered a severe blow to the morale of the Persian army, but this allegation
comes in all probability from men who must know our real grounds for action
and who have very uneasy consciences themselves.
The Food Situation.
12. The arrival of Mr. Sheridan, the American Food Adviser, at the end
of September, although it took place three months too late for any effective control
of the 1942 harvest to be organised, has profoundly altered the situation. Shortly
before his arrival, M. Farrukh was appointed Minister of Food in supersession
of M. Ardalan. The newly-constituted Food Ministry was in the curious position
of having no one among its senior officials with any direct knowledge of Persian
wheat problems, but Mr. Sheridan, who is a man of great energy and drive, though
apt to leap to hasty and ill-considered conclusions, was undaunted. He was
unwilling to adopt the suggestion that he should discuss the situation with
M. Bader, ex-Minister of Finance, before reaching any conclusions, but accepted
instead the advice of Mr. Kahn, Economic Adviser to the Minister of State,
who happened to be on a visit to Tehran and who urged that it was anomalous
to try to maintain an official price of 1,400 to 1,800 rials (£11 to £14) against
a price of £25 to £35 elsewhere in the Middle East—x-an argument which ignores
the fact that the Indian price continues to be about £12 per ton. The unanimous
opinion of a meeting of British officials with local knowledge, who were invited
to meet Mr. Sheridan at the legation to discuss the situation, was unable to deter
h"im from accepting Mr. Kahn’s advice, and the official price of wheat throughout
the country was raised to 3,000 (and in some areas 3,500) rials a ton.
13. Parallel with the financial negotiations, though not officially linked
with them, there were conversations about the food supply. In October the Prime
Minister telegraphed to Mr. Churchill and the Shah to His Majesty The King,
asking to be supplied with 25,000 tons of wheat and 150 lorries. Similar telegrams
were sent to the United States. To ask for wheat when their own harvest was
only just beginning to come in, and for transport, when they had delayed seven
weeks to accept the Anglo-American proposals for a Road Transport Board and
were still displaying little energy in making a complete survey of existing
transport, seemed highly unreasonable; but evidence began to come to light,
suggesting that the shortage of transport was perhaps rather greater than had