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some serious A.R.P. organisation would have disappeared, while our military
plans would have been wrecked by the necessity to evacuate military establish
ments and aerodromes in Tehran. This lack of confidence shows itself, too. in
less direct ways. Persian politicians and officials do not like to be associated
with the arrest of Axis sympathisers and agents, presumably thinking that by
some complacency towards Axis activities they will not be irretrievably
compromised if the Germans reach this country. Similarly, the unwillingness
i the Persian Government to hold the large quantities of sterling paid in return
for the rials used by our military authorities may be traceable to a fear that they
will not, in the end, be able to use the sterling to import goods. Difficulties over
the food supply are largely due to the fact that landowners and peasants and
even local officials are calculating to some extent on greater military and economic
difficulties in the Middle East, and are holding out for famine prices. This
lack of confidence has even found expression in the press. One or two Tehran
newspapers have published commentaries on the war in Russia which could
hardly have been bettered by German propagandists. Hostile articles on the
subject of the arrests of suspects have also appeared. The Prime Minister has,
I am glad to say, taken firm action by reminding the press of the powers which
the Government holds under the Military Governorship Law of 1911. and by
suppressing a number of newspapers which over-stepped the limit. He has stood
up firmly to the Deputies, and he has told his colleagues that they can resign
if they will not do what is necessary as regards the purchase of rials with sterling
and the arrest of suspects. He has shown considerable courage in giving a lead
to his countrymen, and the same can be said of the Shah.
Mr. Churchill's Visit.
22. The visit of Mr. Winston Churchill to Tehran, on his way to and from
Russia, undoubtedly had a profound effect on the Persian Government in
increasing confidence in the Allied cause. Mr. Churchill saw both the Shah and
the Persian Prime Minister on the 12th August, and his personality had a tonic
effect on all those to whom he talked. I cannot exaggerate the effect of such visits
from leading personalities from the Allied side in flattering and encouraging the
Persians. Mr. Wendell Willkie has also recently passed (through, and fiis
visit, too, has been an unqualified success. His clear statement that it is time
for the friends of the Allies to stand up and be counted and that, in effect, Persia
could not go on hoping to get something for nothing, was a timely hint and
has had a most useful reaction, however disappointing the results may have been
for the Persian Government. It would have been difficult for a British statesman
in present circumstances to say the same with equal effect.
Anglo-A merican Co-operation in Persia.
23. Qawam es Saltaneh has adopted as one of the planks of his policy
closer co-operation with America. This is, I think, in every way an advantage
from the Allied point of view. We are unable at the present time to produce a
considerable number of first-class advisers ourselves, and, if we did. Russian
suspicions might well be aroused. Persians are in many ways more open to
approach from the American than from the British side. They are afraid of
Powers who are neighbours of Persia and always suspect ulterior intentions.
The Americans represent for them the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon nations without
any of the disadvantages. From time to time I have detected a certain tendency
on the part of the Persian Government to play us off against the Americans here,
and it was curious that Qawam es Saltaneh showed himself genuinely surprised
when I told him recently that we were in favour of an American military mission
if it could be arranged and had so informed the State Department some months
ago. Although the present American Minister sometimes, unwittingly I am
sure, does not attempt to discourage such an idea in the Persian mind, the close
relations between the British and American Legations and between the British
authorities and the American advisers who are now beginning to arrive have
so far prevented any misunderstandings. It is all-important to keep closely in
step with the Americans, since an increase of American influence is taking place
here as the American advisers arrive and take up their duties in the various
ministries, and as more and more American technicians come to superintend and
assist the transport of goods to Russia. So far as this legation is concerned
every possible step will continue to be taken to work in the closest co-operation
both with them and with the Soviet Embassy and authorities.