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likely to get further suspects handed over if such suspects are,kept by us at
Kermanshah or some other town where the climate is less hot.
7. There are undoubtedly many Persians who would be glad to see the
Germans come and put an end to the presence of Russian and British troops on
Persian soil. This feeling is to be attributed partly to the not unreasonable
nationalism, partly to a widespread belief that the Allies are responsible for the^^
present regime of short supplies of bread, sugar, piece-goods and other necessaries^
coupled with very high prices. Our energetic propaganda is not without effect,
but without an Allied victory now and then at some point nearer to Persia than
Midway Island, to offset the traditional suspicion of Great Britain and Russia,
4 ,\t has a heavy task. We cannot at present hope to make the Allies popular, but
we must try to make the espousal of the Axis cause dangerous, even at the risk
of driving the movement underground. It is believed" that as the Germans
j ^approach nearer to Persia, some of the more sensible of those who have hitherto
sighed for their coming begin to have doubts; but it would be dangerous to regard
, this as a very important factor in our favour, though there are many Persians
Iwho do not wish their country to become a battlefield or to be turned into scorched
earth.
8. The question which has undoubtedly worried Persian opinion most in
. the last two months is whether there will not shortly be another famine here as
in the last war. Already in the winter 1940 and the following spring there was
a wheat shortage which, although relieved by imports from India, left Persia
with no reserves. Our entry into the country just when last year’s harvest
operations were in full swing led to the collapse of Government authority,
especially in the main producing areas, and little effort was consequently made
to collect the share of the wheat crop on which the Government usually relies for
the feeding of the capital and principal towns. Stocks were pillaged and either
eaten or secreted by peasants, while the rich clung to what they might require
and speculated with what they did not. Those near the western frontier took
advantage of the high prices in Iraq and Turkey to smuggle their ill-gotten gains
and any other surplus grain they might have across the border. The Persian
Government, urged to tackle seriously the problem of hoarded stocks by the simple
method of raising prices, have obstinately refused to try this obvious expedient
for fear of its effect on their future policy and on the economic life of the country
as a whole. They have been content to let matters take their course, to blame
the Russians for not letting the wheat surplus in Azerbaijan find its normal
market in Tehran, and to rely on His Majesty's Government to make up the
wheat deficit by imports frorn abroad. This we have done to the tune of over
70,000 tons or one-fifth of the whole of the Persian Government’s requirements
for the year.
9. These imports have now come to an end; the new harvest is being reaped,
and henceforth the Persian Government must stand on their own feet. The
prospect is not encouraging. The Government price for the new crop has indeed
been raised to about £12 a ton, which is apparently the price current in India,
but though in some districts, notably those in East Persia, the new prices are
considered adequate, in others further concessions will be necessary if the farmers
are to be induced willingly to surrender their surplus. These the Government
are unwilling to grant as they consider the prices are fair and that they will be
• able to collect the proprietors' surplus, if necessary, by the use of force. After
much delay the Government has secured from the Majlis wide powers to proceed
against hoarding, w^hich is the logical result of their attitude as regards price;
but so far practically nothing has been done to exercise these powers except for
a few local raids, notably in Khuzistan.
10. The consular liaison officer scheme which has been separately reported
and which is now being put into execution as and when officers become available
was devised to assist the Persian Government in their efforts; but difficulties
in getting officers to operate the scheme before the crops have all been harvested
must seriously prejudice the chances of its success. The next two months will
show whether the moral influence which is all that we can at present exercise in
this enormous and most difficult problem is sufficient to overcome to a sufficient
degree the lethargy and corruption of Persian officialdom. The scales are
certainly loaded heavily against us, but we are doing our best.
11. The general uncertainty and uneasiness of the general public concerning
the food supply has been reflected in a series of anti-Government intrigues in the
Majlis. At about the beginning of July the opposition of the Adalat party,
headed by a Sheikh Ali Dashti, became prominent, and was said by the party to
be based on two things : first, the vacillation of the Prime Minister, who had