'File 2/15 Iraq coup d'etat and political situation in Iraq' [‎69r] (135/414)

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Mi
flgbt against ua arid that It would retroat in diaordep after the
flrat serlooe bombing attack* It la poaeible that thie opinion
was net confined to British circXea an 5 the result of ef the initial
fighting waa no doubt unexpeetedly haartening to Rashid All and
the arsgr eoaiatandara* Their foreea bed resisted the first
onslaught of tht great Britiah s^plre and they had reason to hope
for early and effestive help from the Axis* For a brief
intoxicating moment they felt themselves to be* and were hai ieo.
as 9 the leaders of a great /rab risorgimento* By propagcsrida*
which employed all the tricks of the most up-to-date Buropean models
the t>ovemment eueoeeded in infecting public opinion in Bagdad
with something of their own highstrung reaction to the crisis.
Public opinion in Iraq, as in all countries without intellectual
habits, depends on public feeling, and the de facto Oovemuient
did everything they could think of t© *>lsy on the emotions of the
people. By impassioned harangues broadcast in every coffee-shop,
by poems, speeches and aeruiona, by aiartlal music and processions
of youth they strove to stir up a patriotic and religious fervour
for tht; struggle upon which they had embarked end to embitter
the hearts of the people against Great Britain. I do not yet
know to what extent they succeeded elsewhere, but in Bagdad they
aroused popular excitement and enthusiasm to a high pitch. In
such ciiM&UBJStanocs the safety of the British lives under isy care
in the Embassy was a grave anxiety. A few rifles, s supply of
au^mnition and a small quantity of tear-gas bombs had been collected
in the Chancery and under the direction of ^ajor-General Weterhouae
and two officers of the British Military mission these arms were
distributed and the defence of the building organised. With these
limited resources It was hoped that it would be possible to beat
off any sudden attempt that might be sade by a rabble to break
into the promisee but it was of course clear that a few untrained
men with riflee could not hope to defend the Embassy against
an organised attack, whether by Iraqi armed forces or by semi-
organised civilian insurgents like the palest ini an Mujahidin.
19. Our first line of defence was the police, of whom
about twenty had been posted at our gates* Oar own emergency
defences could not be expected to held out for long, if the police
failed* Apart from thia dependence on the de facto authorities
for protection wc were also dependent on them for electricity,
water and a 11 food and medical supplies* The reserves of food
which had been collected in the Embassy were soon reduced to a
dangerously low level and the large daily deliveries of fresh
food ani other auppliea needed to maintain in health the three
hundred and fifty men, women and children of several different
races who took refuge in my house could only be obtained through the
good will ani good offices of the authorities. I was obliged,there-
fore, to be more circumspect in wy dealings with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs than I should have been had I been responsible only
for the safety and welfare of a small official staff* I naturally
assume full responsibility for every decision which X took, but I
would add that 1 carefully considered each question aa it arose
in conaultatlcn with the senior members of my staff and with senior
officials aueh as General Waterhouse, the Head of the British
Military Mission, and Mr* Sdaonds f Adviser to the Ministry of the
Interior. We were and s till are of the op ini an that during the
first two days the fate of the Embassy an of those living in it
hung in the balance ana that the Iraqi authorities, deceived by
their