Coll 15/1 'Egypt Affairs: General Situation 1931; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936' [‎12v] (25/493)

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ex-Prime Ministers. The Foreign Office
had viewed the creation of this body with
misgivings (which the future most abun
dantly justified) since in the absence of a
“ united front.’’ such as had existed in
1936, the delegation was a collection of
individuals with their own political axes to
grind, and their own political futures to
serve. Sir R. Campbell was instructed
(since the delegation, despite its numbers,
of course contained no Wafdist) to ask the
Egyptian Government for an assurance
that the delegation was sufficiently repre
sentative to warrant the assumption that
a treaty negotiated with them had a
reasonable chance of being implemented.
The request was put both to the King and
to Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , and the reply was affirma
tive.
7. His Majesty’s Government had
decided that negotiations on their side
could conveniently be conducted by the
Ambassador assisted by the Service Com
manders in Egypt and by the senior
members of his staff. This, however, was
too modest an array for the Egyptians who,
pointing to their row of dignitaries and
ex-Prime-Ministers, insisted that their
amour 'pro'pre demanded an answering
gesture from the British side—and indeed
that Sir R. Campbell might feel isolated
in the presence of sudh overwhelming
Egyptian numbers. His Majesty’s Govern
ment were ready to meet Egypt’s wishes,
and appointed the Foreign Secretary to
lead the British Delegation assisted by
Viscount Stansgate, then Secretary of
State for Air, and His Majesty’s Ambassa
dor, the delegation being advised by Sir K.
Cornwallis, Sir A. Overton, the Service
Commanders and Major-General Jacob,
then serving in the Chiefs of Staff Secre
tariat, It was decided that the Secretary
of State should not proceed to Egypt, at
any rate at the outset, but that Lord
Stansgate should conduct the negotiations
on his behalf. Lord Stansgate and his
party arrived in Egypt on 15th April.
8. Before this had happened, however,
the first phase of the negotiations, which
may be termed the private and exploratory,
had opened between Sir R. Campbell and
the King and Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , and was des
tined to last until 30th April. It had’been
borne in upon Sir R. Campbell on arrival
and from subsequent representations deliv
ered by Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. on the psychological
factors present in Egypt, that there
was no statesman or party in Egypt who
would be prepared to subscribe to the
presence of British forces in Egypt in
peace-time, whether in the Canal Zone or
anywhere else, and that an attempt by
Majesty’s Government to insist on the
realisation of their full objectives as set
forth above would produce anti-British
disturbances on a major scale. It moreover
emerged that Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. was not ready
to adopt the proposed regional app roac h
(see paragraph 3 (a)) and this concej^Jfhi
henceforth dropped out of the discussions,
except for a half-hearted effort by the
Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs on
a later occasion to revive it, and for its
canvassing by Lord Altrincham in the
House of Lords when opportunity offered.
The Ambassador’s telegrams to this effect
were accordingly discussed with the dele
gation and the Chiefs of Staff and revised
instructions were issued to Sir R. Campbell
on 16th April. These instructions were
finally communicated to Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. on
19th April, after a preliminary conversa
tion on 18th April, in the form of an aide
memoire, reproduced in Annex 1 to this
memorandum. The main points were :—
(1) The evacuation of all British com
batant troops by stages, with the
exception of fighter squadrons
(though in the last resort the delega
tion was authorised to accept the
withdrawal of such squadrons as
from the time when the Egyptian
air force was in a position to pro
vide a peace-time garrison, it being
understood that our own squadrons
could be free to return in emer-
gency).
(2) The maintenance by Egypt, with
British collaboration, of naval, land
and air administrative defence
organisations.
(3) Permission for the transit of troops
and aircraft and the maintenance of
a transit organisation.
(4) The creation of a regional head
quarters in the Canal Zone.
(5) The provision of equipment for the
Egyptian forces.
9. Both the King and Sidky made it
clear from the outset that proposals on the
above lines stood no chance of acceptance.
On 22nd April Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. communicated
to Lord Stansgate the opinion of the
Egyptian military authorities on the pro
posals in the aide-memoire, together with
a note embodying his own conclusions.
These documents constituted a complete
rejection of His Majesty's Government’s
proposals. Accordingly, on 22nd April,
Lord Stansgate reported that “ we have
exhausted the possibilities of progress in
preliminary talks with the King and Sidky