Coll 15/1 'Egypt Affairs: General Situation 1931; Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936' [‎26v] (53/493)

32
and simple text in the place of one
providing for a commission to make recom
mendations on the future of the Sudan.
4. To meet the Egyptians, I agreed to
recommend this course to the British
Cabinet. As I see the position, I am now
asked to subscribe to Sidky’s indiscretions
and acquiesce in his attempt to saddle His
Majesty’s Government with an under
taking which I did not agree to recommend,
and that I am afraid—whatever the conse
quences—I cannot do. Really, Nokrashi
must eradicate the opinion created here by
Sidky.
5. I have already made it quite clear to
my colleagues in His Majesty’s Govern
ment that the principle I was following
was to initiate and develop an era oi
co-operation; that I recognised that
economically the Sud^n was vital to Egypt;
that nothing must be done which would
have the effect of creating (in the words of
the Egyptian negotiators) an “ unfriendly
Sudan ”; and that if at some future date,
which we all agreed was a good way off,
such an event took place entailing
independence, there would then be the dual
obligation to use all our influence to protect
the economic necessities of Egypt.
6. It has been suggested that while
administering the Sudan we are
deliberately and wilfully intending to
encourage secession. The answer to that
is “ No.” for the mere fact that I offered
that a commission should, after a certain
delay, examine the whole position jointly,
is an indication of our approach to the
problem. But I must repeat that His
Majesty’s Government cannot deprive the
Sudanese, to use Sidky’s own words, of the
right, when they reach a certain point of
development, to become independent, if
they so wish. His Majesty’s Government
cannot under such circumstances bind
themselves now or future Governments of
Great Britain to oppose that development,
but in the meanwhile our policy of mutual
effort and collaboration stands.
7. Having thus made clear my position,
I can only put forward the following
suggestions in the hope they may provide
Nokrashi with an alternative to the
position which has unfortunately been
created. His Majesty’s Government are
prepared to sign the treaty of mutual
assistance, including the evacuation
protocol initialled with Sidky Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , but
excluding the Sudan Protocol, subject to
an understanding that the convention of
1899 and article 11 of the 1936 treaty
remains in force—and thereafter to
proceed to a conference on the Sudan
question at which the United Kingdom,
Egypt and the Sudan would be represented.
Alternatively, His Majesty’s Government
would be ready to sign the treaty with the
Sudan Protocol, but on the understanding
indicated above, i.e .—
(1) that the Sudanese right to o^oose
their future status is not restricted;
(2) that, whatever the choice, a solemn
pledge will be given by His
Majesty’s Government that suitable
safeguards will be provided for
Egypt’s permanent interests: in
other words, making it clear, as to
(1), that I have not, for any con
sideration, bartered away a people’s
rights which, whether we conclude
a treaty or not. we are not prepared
to do, especially when those rights
may—in Sidky’s words—be exer
cised in circumstances that cannot
now be foreseen.
8. I can say definitely that, provided we
reach an honest understanding and a
square deal, the policy of His Majesty’s
Government is to provide the interests of
the economic development of the peoples
concerned and to remove the Sudan ques
tion from the state of controversy in which
it has been. But if Nokrashi remains
immovable I would like you to ask whether
it is any use trying to make any further
effort in understanding or whether we must
allow the 1936 treaty to continue.
9. I would emphasise that the only thing
in dispute between Egypt and Great
Britain is the Sudan Protocol. Everything
else is settled. On the Sudan Protocol the
only thing in dispute is whether two
parties will enter into a treaty depriving
a third party of its rights, which may be
exercised at some distant date.
10. If Nokrashi, on his side, is ready to
agree to one or the other of the above
alternatives in paragraph 7, I for my part
am prepared to make a statement (as
suggested in your telegram No. 1942)
namely, that His Majesty’s Government
have no intention of encouraging the
Sudanese to separate themselves from
Egypt and, if the Sudan eventually chooses
to remain united to Egypt, His Majesty’s
Government will place no obstacle in the
way and will be happy to see this happen.
Otherwise I should be forced to add to
such a statement a clear explanation of
His Majesty’s Government’s position as
stated in the present telegram. I am
saying nothing for the moment but I cannot
be asked to remain silent indefinitely in
view of the growing feelings in this