Coll 6/88 'Intelligence: Military Report on Arabia (C.B. 1892).' [‎36r] (76/133)

45
Small blockhouses command the approaches to the towns of MUSCAT and MATRAH
from the land side.
The forts, combined with the numerous strong points commanding MUSCAT and
MATRAH, if manned by an intelligent enemy with machine guns and rifles, would make
landing in boats on the beaches at or near these towns difficult, if not impossible, in daylight.
The Levies are the only State Force. The composition is 150 men (mostly Baluchis)
under the command of a retired British Regular Cavalry Officer with two ex Indian officers
to assist him. Their chief duty is to form the Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. guard.
The Barracks are at BEIT-AL-FELEJ*
(13) Reconnaissance
Bearing in mind that our more probable role would be that of a defender against attacking
forces from the interior, the information has been given from that point of view, which would
be equally applicable if attacking by land, although a sea bombardment would probably be
the most efficacious.
MUSCAT itself is hemmed in on all sides, its sea frontage by rocky and precipitous
hills varying from 300 to 500 ft. in height. Even from the arms of the small beach, rocky
eminences protrude into the sea. Full use has been made in the past of these vantage points,
but the forts would now only be serviceable against small arms fire.
Three passes give egress to MUSCAT ; a short road from BANDAR SIDAB, a footpath
across the hills from RUWI entering MUSCAT from the south, and, lastly, and most important,
the coast road from MATRAH. This road passes through two narrow defiles cut. through the
rock, the first at the point of descent into MUSCAT (overlooking the town), the second at
BANDAR ZAINAKI, between RIYAM and MATRAH. Given adequate fire power, either
could be held by a very small force. The road to BANDAR SIDAB is short and passes into
MUSCAT through a similar defile from the south-east. It represents, in fact, a back door
that should not be overlooked.
The only pass to the interior is via MATRAH and thence by a road that leads out through
the hills southwards across a broad open valley to RUWI, where tracks diverge to the interior
and the BATINEH coast road follows the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. to the sea. The northern end of this valley
is commanded by BEIT-AL-FELEJ, the fort around which the Levies camp is situated.
Also Levies picket posts on the WATAIYA hills command valleys on both sides from a
flanking position.
In the BEIT-AL-FELEJ valley and in the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. , which the coast road follows, are lines
of karezs (small earth emplacements for a few riflemen) which would provide quite good
cover in the open ground against advancing forces.
It is in this valley that any forces bent on attacking MUSCAT or MATRAH would have
to fight a decisive action. Moreover, since it is only to be entered by passes (even to seaward
from DARSAIT) it is clear that the defenders have a considerable advantage.
A landing on a small scale might be useful to block a retreat of the invaders, but if an
attack on MUSCAT was the object, considerably superior forces and weapons would be
necessary.
Landing Beaches
The three beaches at DARSAIT, WATAIYA, and the long sandy shore to the west,
which is the beginning of the BATINEH coast, are all good sandy beaches with clear
anchorages off them, but they would appear to be open to both the SHAMAL and the NASHI.
DARSAIT has a mountainous hinterland, similar to MATRAH and MUSCAT ; on the
remaining two the ground initially is open and undulating with plenty of scrub. They are
normally unfrequented and surprise should be easy.
Water Supplies
There is water, and good camping sites, at WATAIYA, RUWI and BEIT-AL-FELEJ.
Emergency Landing Grounds
No possible emergency landing ground exists other than that normally used by the
Royal Air Force [see Section VI, Muscat, paragraph (7)).
(C43043) 375 12/41