File 3360/1916 Pt 2 'Persian correspondence. (1917-18)' [‎295v] (595/678)

While financial proposals are attractive, promise of indemnity for losses
from enemy endeavour is to be deprecated. Sum would be very large and
amount difficult to establish. So far no such suggestion has yet occurred*to the
Persians themselves and a very much smaller amount of cash down would be
far more attractive than any distant prospect. If any such inducement is
required, payment of British claims by oursehes would suffice.
Promise of a loan is more useful, but it should be for a loan to be given in
future. We should destroy our strongest weapon if we gave one now. We
could promise to grant it on conditions to be arranged with French Financial
experts whom Persian Government desire to engage, and we shall thus have
opportunity of instituting some measure of supervision. Word “control”
must be absolutely excluded; it is Anathema.
As regards point 2 , proposal would be acceptable if presented in shape of
an engagement to commence creation of uniform force under neutral officers ;
there is a growing tendency here however to require that these officers shall
be selected from a non-belligerent country. Eesponsible Persians have no
wish to see South Persia Bifles and Cossack Division disappear and it is quite
probable I think that a French Staff charged with amalgamation of these forces
and gendarmerie would be well received.
4« Imperial Bank of Persia could not finance any large loan at present,
and monthly advances and subsidies contemplated by His ^Majesty’s Govern
ment seem sufficient, if coulped with prospective loan later in the circumstances
above mentioned.
. -Point 5 should be omitted altogether as we have already intimated
privately our readiness to scrap 1807 Convention.
Moderate people are fairly satisfied with our proffered terms but are afraid
by accepting them to identify themselves with us out of fear of a German
effort.
. .It is not so much a further inducement that they require, as proof of our
ability to protect them and ourselves. If we could count upon General
Baratof’s new formations repeating coup of November 1915 situation here
would be wholly changed.
Very confidential .—I am unaware how His Majesty’s Government
regard introduction of purely French influences in financial affairs of military
questions. ^
I doubt whether French Legation would be of great assistance. In last 2. 1
years French Minister has kept very much in background and has twice
excused himself to me and to Russian Minister from co-operating with us on
the ground that he “ represented only a dozen professors now all on leave.”
Nevertheless France’s influence is still high.
This is with reference to your telegram No. 3 .
23
Telegram P., No. 179-20-G., dated the 5th (received 6th) January 1918.
From—The Chief of the General Staff, South Persia Rifles, Sistan.
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department, Delhi.
(Addressed Minister, Tehran ; repeated Chief of the General Staff and Sykes, Delhi.)
There are indications from several reliable sources that Soulet is endea
vouring to undermine Qawam and create dissensions amongst Arab tribes.
Recent attacks on our convoys between Tarum and Bandar Abbas may
be attributed entirely to Soulet’s intrigues J
Qawam who recently had trouble with his Arab Kalantars at Kharameh
has now left there with his South Persia Rifles escort under Captain Butters
I or -Uarab.