File 3516/1914 Pt 11 'Persia: protection of Anglo-Persian Oil Co's fields etc' [‎253r] (510/550)

SECRET .
I ■iQ.u, t.
Letter No. 304*4-0, dated 19th (received 28tft) June 1915.
From—The General Officer Commanding, Force “ D”, Basi^h.
To—The Chief of the General Staff.
[Diary No. S.
I 34 2 3')
I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief, correspondence and military reports regarding the military
action necessary for the security and maintenance of the Oil Fields and pipe line
in the event of the Persian Government proclaiming Jehad.
2 . Although active hostilities by the Bakhtiaris would seem contrary to their
own interests and consequently appear unlikely, the possibility of the tribe being
forced to join in Jehad was represented to me (vide papers attached), and the
contingency had therefore to be considered.
3 . As regatds the military action which might be required, I am not in
favour of half measures.
In the event of disturbances in Persia endangering the Oil Fields, and of the
Bakhtiaris giving the promised 20 days’ notice that they could no longer protect
that concern, two courses only commend themselves to me, viz :—
(a) To despatch such a military force to guard the pipe line and the Oil
Fields as will be capable of dealing with any combination or dis
turbance which might endanger the pipe line ;
(h y To shut down the Oil Fields temporarily and to withdraw' the person
nel, until the Bakhtiaris resumed their engagements.
4 . As regards (a), it wdll be evident from the reports enclosed that the force
required could not be furnished from the troops now at my disposal, although I
do not subscribe to all the measures advocated.
I also consider it doubtful, even if reinforcements w f ere available, whether j
their arrival in time could be relied on.
5 . I am therefore in favour of course (3). For, even if the Bakhtiaris
could not protect individuals in the event of Jehad, they would probably be able
to prevent any serious damage to property in which they have an interest, and
they have already learned from experience that the cessation of pumping and
the waste of oil affect their pockets.
In the event of any disturbance short of Jehad, I do not consider that the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company has anything to fear from the Bakhtiaris, so long as
we do not put military posts and detachments in Bakhtiari territory.
6 . As regards the other tribes I see no reason to apprehend any hostile
action with which the force at Ahw'az could not promptly deal, so long as the
general situation remains as at present; but I am trying to conclude early
arrangements with all tribes along the pipe line which w r ill give them, like the
Bakhtiaris, an interest in the maintenance and security of the pipe line down to
Abadan.
At the present moment a portion of my force is more or less locked up in
Persian territory to which a separate line of communications has to be maintained,
but as soon as the arrangements I advocate are in working order there would
seem no military reason for keeping any troops on the Karun River.
In view of the advantages to be gained by tribal responsibility for the pipe
line, I trust that these papers may be placed before the Foreign Department of
the Government of India.
S 1378 GSB