File 3360/1916 Pt 1 'Persian correspondence (1916-17)' [‎189v] (383/804)

Officer Commanding, Kertmn,
August.
Chief of the General Staff and General
No. 170 of 3is 0 Sykes. In the meantime Merrill’s posi
tion at Sirjan was critical and unless
immediate steps were taken to overawe
the district by a show of force Hossain Khan and the escaped prisoners might
obtain a considerable following.
2nd September.
Sykes’ No. 578-C., 1st September 1916.
Chief of the General Staff’s telegram
Chief of the General Sta
bar (September pj 1916.
No. 76918, 2nd Oc o’
Fraser’s Column waiting in
General Sykes’ telegram No. 578-C. was received which
agreed in all details with the plan I had
already intended to adopt The same day
No. 760d8-C. -was received. It was not
clear from this telegram where Chief of
the General Staff intended the concentra
tion should take place. In any case
to concentrate the Column, either by
Kerman till Wagstaff’s Column arrived or by
i 9 i 6 . mmanding ’ Kerman ’ N0,180 of 3rd 0cto ber sending k’raser back to meet Wagstaff,
would have meant a delay of 7 to 10 days
lelore the Columns so concentrated could move on Sirian. Delay appeared
most inadvisable.
I consideied that it would be running no undue risk to send Lieutenant
Erasers Column from Kerman to Sirjan while Captain Wagstaff’s Column
(joined with Smith s) moved from Baft to Sirjan. It was hoped that the two
co umns converging from different points would confuse Hussain Khan and
ave t ie desired effect upon the district. I did not consider it likely that
ussam Khan would attack either column, as the strength of Column moving
m ejs ' a is always very largely exaggerated and at that time Hussain Khan
was reported to have a following of only about 150 men. Merrill had by this
ime collected some 2 (j 0 to 300 levies though these w r ere of very doubtful
qua i y and without the support of regular troops could not be counted upon.
, was ^iculated that the two Columns should reach Sirjan about the
same day. I therefore issued orders accordingly.
September. Lieutenant Fraser’s Column left Kerman on the 6th
ep em er, t e delay being unavoidable owing to transport difficulties (which
mus a ways e reckoned with in moving troops in Persia). Strength British
o ceis , th Lancers 30. 70 of the 12Hh Baluchis, 1 mountain gun and 38
Sykes, No. 589-C. of 6tb October (September?) 1 9 I6- g UrmerS ? 0n ^ Sanie d ay General Sykes’
t telegram approving the move was received,
ord was received from Wagstaff that his column had
reached Baft and that he was preparing to move on Sirjan. The strength of
ins Column (together with Smith’s) was given as follows. British Officers
^ ^ 4 (Captain Wagstaff, Lieutenant Carr,
SeptSer Ker “ an ' ^ 206 South Persia Rifles, Captain MeMurray,
Lieutenant Smith, 108th Infantry) ins-
-p..i . . tructors and details for South Persia
^1--108th Infantry 79 (seventy-nine), followers 18.
Of the above 25 rifles were reported sick.
llih September. On the 11th September, I received a report from
Wagstaff that his column had left Baft
Commanding, Kerman, Nos. 213 of 7th Septem
ber and 223 of 12th September 1916.
on the Hh moving towards Mehdiabad.
These movements lead up to the flight of the prisoners into Furs.
16th September. —On the 16th a long report from Captain Wagstaff was
Attached ( 9 k received dated 12th September 0 Malika-
bad, which I forward in full.
It appears that Hussain Khan and the prisoners, alarmed by approach of
the Columns, fled’ from Balvard on the night 8-9th towards Darab. Wagstaff’s
foice reached Mohamedabad evening 8th and on the 9th moved to Dhanu,
3 farsaks from Balvard, where he first heard of the flight of Hussain Khan
from Balvard.
Fraser arrived Saidahad after sunset on the 10th, and hearing the news
irom Mei rill at once set off in pursuit with his 30 Cavalry and some 50 Persian
g >w ars, to try to cut off the escaping prisoners. He reached Zavaree well