File 3360/1916 Pt 1 'Persian correspondence (1916-17)' [‎274r] (552/804)

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training and discipline should be inculcated by specially smart European non
commissioned officer. Could you help start training school by despatch with
reinforcements one sergeant (gymnast), two non-commissioned officers each
of cavalry, field artillery, infantry, and machine guns? Total nine. Three
Indian Sub-Assistant Surgeons urgently required and also one Eegular Army
supply sergeant for column replace conductor loaned to South Persia Rifles.
Supply question South Persia Rifles involves large sums of money and needs
expert supervision. Could all above details be despatched with reinforcements
via Ahwaz.
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Telegram P., No. T.-40, dated (and received) the 16th November 1916.
From—The Hon’ble the Political Resident A senior ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul General) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Residency. in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political
Department.
(Addressed Chief of the General Staff, Force f< D/ 5 )
Just as a telegram communicating my own view to Army Commander was
on the point of issuing I received copy of Army Commander’s telegram to
India regarding escort of German prisoners to Bushire. My views were based
on hypothesis that it might now be considered expedient to settle hinterland
question and in case that view may be taken by Government it seems as well
to let my telegram issue and I trust that Army Commander will approve of
my having repeated to Eoreign Department. Telegram begins. On arrival at
Bushire November 15th I saw correspondence ending with Deputy Chief
Political Officer’s telegram 5862, November 11th, asking for my views regarding
proposed escort of Shiraz prisoners to Bushire. Sykes’ telegram 952, November
Idith, to Chief of the General Staff, India, and Eoreign suggesting that certain
small reinforcements now under despatch to him should be sent by Bushire
instead of via Ahwaz has also reached me.
Both these Shiraz proposals ignore state (of) relation(s) existing between
Persian and British Governments and Khans of Borasjun, Chahkuta and Tan-
gistan. The following is the position :—
(1) Vis-a-vis Persian Government. They are rebels and have been
officially deposed from their posts. Eor years they have paid no revenue and
they continue to write impertinent letters to Governor of Bushire. The pun
ishment of these rebels was on the foremost condition in our announcement to
the Persian Government in connection with occupation of Bushire on August
8th, 1915. It is still unfulfilled. Case of Daliki is practically the same as that
of Borasjun with whom he is allied.
(2) Vis-a-vis British Government. In our negotiations for release ©f
O’Connor and party it was specifically ordered that we were to give Khans no
sort of assurance of immunity from subsequent punishment at our hands
and I understand attitude of Government to be that they have every intention
of punishing them at the earliest convenient opportunity. Borasjun is now
engaged in endeavouring to get Shief route closed against us; the other two are
harbouring remainder of gang who murdered Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. Agent, Lingah, and
his brothers.
My opinion therefore is that if it is contemplated to send any British
troops through the limits of these Khans to bring prisoners from Kazeroon,
their districts must be treated as enemy territory and our force must be
sufficient to deal with them at the same time. What precise strength is
necessary is a military question but having regard to large numbers of machine
guns with General Officer Commanding, Bushire, three battalions should
suffice. I suggest, however, that two or four mountain guns would be desirable
in addition. Such a force should be well able to deal with hostile Khans and
keep road open up to Daliki. Section between Daliki and Kazeroon depends
on Soulet’s attitude at the moment and also of Kashkulis ; with strong posts at
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